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Full text of "Brazil, the United States, and the missile technology control regime"

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CftUFORWA 93340 



NPS- 5 6-90-006 



I NPS- 

T$ 



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 

Monterey, California 




i 



BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE 



MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 



by 
SCOTT D. TOLLEFSON 



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BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (Unclassified) 



PERSONA L AuThOR(S) 

SCOTT D. T0LLEFS0N 



3d 'YP£ OF REPORT 



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9 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverie if necemry r nd identify .toy block number) ,....„. .. . . ,. , ,, _ 

This technical report analyzes Brands development of ballistic missiles in light of U.S. pressures 

to stifle that development. The first section describes and critiques the Missile Technology Control Regime 

(MTCR); the second analyzes the U.S. application of MTCR guidelines toward Brazil; the third assesses Brazil's 

ballistic missile capabilities; and the fourth considers Brazil's response. 

The report concludes that the U.S. policy of restricting space and missile technology to Brazil under 
the MTCR has succeeded in stalling Brazil's missile program, but has also (1) further strained Brazilian 
security relations with the United States; (2) weakened U.S. influence over Brazil's rocket and missile 
programs; (3) strengthened Brazilian ties with European suppliers (especially France) of space and missile 
technology; (4) driven Brazil into closer technological cooperation with the People's Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union; and (5) intensified Brazilian negotiations with Iraq and Libya. As Brazil moves away from the 
United States (its traditional supplier of space and missile technology), it is becoming relatively more 
autonomous and less vulnerable to U.S. restrictions on space and missile technology. 

The successful implementation of an internationalist development strategy by Brazil's new president, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, could provide the United States with an exceptional opportunity to improve relations 
with Brazil. The United States could possibly negotiate the easing of MTCR restrictions on space technology 
to Brazil without jeopardizing the goal of ballistic missile non-proliferation. 



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SCOTT D. T0LLEFS0N 



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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ABSTRACT i 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ii 

INTRODUCTION 1 

I. THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 4 

A. The Implementation of the MTCR 5 

B. General Critique of the MTCR 7 

II. U.S. POLICY 12 

A. Bureaucratic Politics: Competing Views 12 

B. U.S. Concerns 15 

1. Brazil's nuclear program 15 

2. Brazil's policy and pattern of arms 

exports 17 

3. Brazil's potential threat to regional 

(Latin American) security 18 

4. Brazil's potential threat to U.S. 

security 19 

5. Brazil as U.S. competitor 19 

III. BRAZIL'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM 21 

A. Rationale 21 

B. Space Program as Precursor 2 6 

1. Origins 28 

2. Role of the United States 29 

3. Civilian-Military Role Conflict ... 32 

4. Sonda Program 3 6 

C. Current Missile Capabilities 39 

1. Military applications of Brazil's 

space program 3 9 

2. Current ballistic missile projects . . 42 

D. Problems Facing Brazil's Missile Program .... 49 

1. Technological Constraints 49 

2. U.S. Restrictions 51 

3. Inadequate funding 54 

IV. BRAZIL'S RESPONSE: SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS .... 58 

A. MTCR Signatories 62 

1. France 62 

2. The Federal Republic of Germany ... 67 

3. United Kingdom 68 

4. Canada 68 

B. MTCR Non-Signatories 69 

1. People's Republic of China 69 

2. Soviet Union 76 

3. Iraq 83 

4. Libya 88 

C. Others 89 

FINAL CONCLUSION 92 



TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 



TABLES Table 1: Sonda Rockets 3 7 

Table 2: Shares of Major Suppliers in Brazil's 
Imports of Major Conventional Weapons, 

1951-1985 64 

i 

APPENDIX Missile Technology Control Regime: Statement 

by the Assistant to the President for Press 

Relations, April 16, 1987 97 

Missile Technology Control Regime: Fact Sheet 

to Accompany Public Announcement 98 

Summary of the Equipment and Technology Annex . . .100 
List of Acronyms 101 



BRAZIL, THE UNITED STATES. AND THE 

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 

NPS-56-90-006 

by 

SCOTT D. TOLLEFSON 

March 1990 



ABSTRACT 

This technical report analyzes Brazil's development of 
ballistic missiles in light of U.S. pressures to stifle that 
development. The first section describes and critiques the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) ; the second analyzes the 
U.S. application of MTCR guidelines toward Brazil; the third 
assesses Brazil's ballistic missile capabilities; and the fourth 
considers Brazil's response. 

The report concludes that the U.S. policy of restricting 
space and missile technology to Brazil under the MTCR has 
succeeded in stalling Brazil's missile program, but has also (1) 
further strained Brazilian security relations with the United 
States; (2) weakened U.S. influence over Brazil's rocket and 
missile programs; (3) strengthened Brazilian ties with European 
suppliers (especially France) of space and missile technology; 
(4) driven Brazil into closer technological cooperation with the 
People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union; and (5) 
intensified Brazilian negotiations with Iraq and Libya. As 
Brazil moves away from the United States (its traditional 
supplier of space and missile technology) , it is becoming 
relatively more autonomous and less vulnerable to U.S. 
restrictions on space and missile technology. 

The successful implementation of an internationalist 
development strategy by Brazil's new president, Fernando Collor 
de Mello, could provide the United States with an exceptional 
opportunity to improve security and trade relations with Brazil. 
The United States could possibly negotiate the easing of MTCR 
restrictions on space technology to Brazil without jeopardizing 
the goal of ballistic missile non-proliferation. 



ACKNOWLEDGMENT 

The author wishes to acknowledge the support received from 

t 
the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation Research Program and to 

thank the following for their comments on earlier drafts of the 

report: Professor Thomas C. Bruneau (Naval Postgraduate School) , 

Professor Renato Dagnino (Universidade de Campinas) , Professor 

Edward J. Laurance (NPS) , Fabrice Edouard Lehoucg (Duke 

University) , First Lieutenant Julio Eduardo da Silva Menezes 

(Brazilian Air Force) ; Lieutenant Thomas A. Murphy (USN) , and 

Lieutenant Colonel David A. Pagni (USA, Defense Intelligence 

Agency) . 

The views expressed in this report are entirely those of the 
author, and should not be interpreted as representing the views 
of the individuals named above, or the official views of the U.S. 
Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, the Naval Postgraduate 
School, or any other government agency. 



11 



INTRODUCTION 

This report is a case study of Brazilian-U.S. relations 
under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) . It analyzes 
Brazil's development of ballistic missiles in light of U.S. 
pressures to stifle that development. 1 Brazil, a leading Third 
World exporter of arms, has launched a series of sounding rockets 
and is now developing a ballistic missile that eventually could 
be topped with nuclear warheads. It has succeeded in enriching 
uranium, and may have the capacity to build nuclear weapons by 



1 A ballistic missile is defined as a "self-propelled weapon- 
delivery system that is guided during a portion of its ascent, then 
follows a ballistic (unpowered and unguided) trajectory over the 
remainder of its flight path." Ballistic missiles are to be 
distinguished from cruise missiles , which are "powered by an air- 
breathing engine and are generally guided for their entire flight." 
Finally, tactical battlefield rockets are "generally unguided and 
have ranges well under 100 miles, but some can deliver warheads as 
large as those on many short- and medium-range missiles." 
Intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range in excess of 5,000 
miles. Brazil already produces tactical battlefield rockets, and 
may be seeking a ballistic missile capability, although nowhere 
near the 5,000-mile range of an intercontinental ballistic missile. 
The sophistication of a cruise missile is still beyond Brazil's 
technological capability, but Brazil is "establishing industries 
that may eventually produce cruise missiles." Definitions from 
Robert D. Shuey, Warren W. Lenhart, Rodney A. Snyder, Warren H. 
Donnelly, James E. Mielke, and John D. Moteff, Missile 
Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces , Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress # 88-642F, Washington, D.C., 
3 October 1988, pages 1, 9, and 44. Hereafter referred to as CRS 
Report. 



the turn of the century. 2 



These events have alarmed U.S. policy-makers, and since 1987 
the United States has restricted the export of rocket and 
ballistic missile technology to Brazil, under the terms of the 
MTCR. The restrictions have succeeded in stalling Brazil's 
satellite launch program as well as ballistic missile research 
and development, while straining U.S. security relations with 
Brazil, and prompting Brazil to explore closer ties with the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) , the Soviet Union, and several 
countries in Europe and the Middle East. 3 

The major argument of this report is that Brazil is becoming 
relatively more autonomous as it develops its satellite launch 
rockets and technology that could be diverted to ballistic 
missiles, moving away from the United States (its traditional 
supplier of rocket technology) , diversifying linkages with other 
suppliers, and becoming more self-sufficient. In the short term, 
Brazil is extremely sensitive and vulnerable to the limitations 



2 Leonard S. Spector writes that "Within a few years, it is 
probable that Brazil will be able to produce unsafeguarded highly 
enriched uranium and, if it does so, it could develop a ready 
nuclear weapons capability - or even nuclear weapons themselves." 
The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1988) : 271. 

3 "Brazil Says Missile Technology Controls Hamper Launch 
Industry," Defense News 4, no. 30 (July 24, 1989): 18; "Satellite 
Launch Delayed by Technology Controls," (in Portuguese), Brasilia 
EBN, 2 March 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-043 
(Annex), 4 March 1988, 1. 



3 
placed by the United States on the transfer of such technology. 
In the long term, however, Brazil is likely to continue to 
diversify its sources of rocket and missile technology, thereby 
becoming less vulnerable (but not necessarily less sensitive) to 
U.S. restrictions. 

The study contains four sections: part I describes the MTCR 
in theory and in practice; part II analyzes the U.S. application 
of MTCR guidelines toward Brazil; part III assesses Brazil's 
ballistic missile capabilities; and part IV considers Brazil's 
response to the U.S. policy of denial. Based solely on 
unclassified sources, an extensive review of both Portuguese and 
English sources was aided by a DIALOG Information Retrieval 
Service search of the PTS Defense Markets and Technology 
database. Interviews were conducted with U.S. policy-makers in 
Washington, D.C. in June and July 1989. Research relating to 
Brazil's armaments industry was carried out in Brasilia, Rio de 
Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Sao Jose dos Campos. 



4 For a discussion of "sensitivity" and "vulnerability" in 
international relations, see Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1977) , especially chapter one. 



I. THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was announced 
by the United States, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) , France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom on 16 April 
1987, after five years of intense negotiations [see Appendix for 
summaries of the MTCR]. The regime's thesis is that ballistic 
missiles are inherently destabilizing, especially when utilized 
as a delivery system for nuclear weapons. The purpose of the 
MTCR is to control the diffusion of technology that could be 
applied to ballistic missile development. The MTCR is not a 
treaty; rather, it is a supplier's regime with no central 
coordinating body, in which adherence to non-proliferation 
guidelines is strictly voluntary. 5 

In the "Equipment and Technology Annex" of the MTCR, two 
categories of export controls were established [see Appendix for 
"Summary of the Equipment and Technology Annex"]. Category I 
includes the most sensitive items, "complete rocket systems 
(including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and 
sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including 
cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) 



5 For an overview of the MTCR, see Frederick J. Hollinger, 
"The Missile Technology Control Regime: A Major New Arms Control 
Achievement," in Daniel Gallik, editor, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers 1987 , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Publication 128 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
March 1988) : 26. 



5 
capable of delivering at least a 500 kilograms payload to a range 
of at least 300 kilometers as well as the specially-designed 
production facilities for these systems." 6 Also covered are 
complete subsystems including "individual rocket stages, reentry 
vehicles, solid or liquid fuel rocket engines, guidance sets, 
thrust vector controls, and warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and 
firing mechanisms." Requests for Category I items are meant to 
be denied by MTCR signatories except in the rarest of 
circumstances, and only with end-use guarantees by the recipient 
country. Category II items include propulsion components, 
propellants, structural materials, flight instruments, avionics, 
launch support equipment and facilities, computers, test 
equipment and facilities, and guidance and control components. 
Such items may be transferred on a case-by-case basis, at the 
sole discretion of the supplier, as long as such transfers do not 
facilitate the development or production of ballistic missiles. 



A. The Implementation of the MTCR 

In practice, there is broad latitude for interpreting the 
MTCR guidelines. In the United States, the implementation of the 
MTCR has been rigid. Requests for items in the MTCR annex, 
Category I, are invariably denied. Although more discretion is 



Emphasis, author's. 



6 
allowed under Category II, such items are almost automatically 
denied. In contrast, France and the FRG have been less 
restrictive in the transfer of missile-related technology. In 
general, they are, less inclined to restrict space technology that 
could be diverted to ballistic missiles, and technology for 
missiles below the MTCR thresholds (500 kilograms, 300 
kilometers) . 7 

The MTCR has achieved its more limited goal of delaying 
missile proliferation among developing countries. By restricting 
missile-related technology, the MTCR has succeeded in increasing 
the time and costs associated with the development of ballistic 
missiles. In Brazil, military officers have openly complained 
that their space programs have been hampered by the MTCR 
restrictions. According to one report, "the Brazilian 
authorities responsible for the Brazilian Complete Space Mission 
have now become persuaded that it is not possible, at least in 
the short term, to count on arranging the transfer of the most 
modern foreign technology for the development of a medium-range 
missile." 9 The restrictions have led Brazil to seek suppliers 



7 See Barbara Starr, Controlling the Spread of Ballistic 
Missiles," Jane's Defence Weekly , 22 April 1989, 696. 

In Portuguese, Missao Espacial Completa Brasileira (MECB) . 

"Lacking Funds, Air Force Retires Piranha," (in Portuguese), 
Correio Braziliense , 6 August 1989, 16; translated and reported in 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter referred to as 
FBIS) LAT-89-191, 4 October 1989, 37. 



7 
outside of the MTCR, and those suppliers within the MTCR that are 
willing to bend or break MTCR guidelines. 10 



B. General Critique of the MTCR 

There are numerous problems associated with the MTCR. 11 

First, and foremost, there is a lack of international consensus 

on the issue of ballistic missile proliferation. Edward J. 

Laurance argues that 

The effectiveness of controls is a function of the 
international consensus on the threat posed by the use 
of that type of weapon. This explains why the nuclear 
non-proliferation effort has been successful and why 
there is virtually no controls at all on a country's 
ability to acquire conventional weapons up to the level 
of howitzers and mortars through private channels. One 
could make a good argument that the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) was only possible because of its 
clear linkage to nuclear non-proliferation. 

As Laurance suggests, to the extent that ballistic missiles are 

linked to nuclear weapons, consensus will be high, but consensus 

will be low when missiles are considered little more than major 

conventional weapons in the same category as advanced fighter 



10 CRS Report, 12-13. 

11 For a superb critique of the MTCR, see Janne E. Nolan, 
"Ballistic Missiles in the Third World - The Limites of 
Nonproliferation, " Arms Control Today , November 1989, 9-14. 

12 Laurance, "Responding to the Proliferation of Ballistic 
Missiles in the Third World: An Analysis of Potential Regimes," 
paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Security 
Studies, Section of the International Studies Association, Whittier 
College, November 1989, 22. 



aircraft. 

Lack of international consensus is apparent in the fact that 
two of the largest producers of missiles, the Soviet Union and 
the PRC, have not joined the MTCR. While the Soviets have 
vaguely stated that they will abide by the guidelines of the 
MTCR, they have not formally joined the MTCR. 13 The PRC, the 
fourth-largest exporter of weapons in the world, has refused to 
adhere to the MTCR. Its absence from the MTCR gives it virtually 
free rein in seeking a greater share of the ballistic missile 
market. 14 The PRC supplied Silkworm missiles to Iran, and in 
1988 sold CSS-2 intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia - 
after the MTCR was announced. Those sales highlight the lack 
of consensus on ballistic missile non-proliferation and undermine 
the cartel-like character of the MTCR. 

Second, there are no sanctions within the MTCR against 
countries or companies that break or bend MTCR guidelines. The 
United States, for example, was the main proponent of the MTCR, 
but cannot prohibit its allies that are co-signatories of the 
MTCR from loosely interpreting its guidelines. France, as noted 



13 There is increasing evidence that the Soviets may sign the 
MTCR, but as of March 1990, that step had not been taken. 

14 CRS Report, 7. 

15 "Shultz Raps China for Building, Selling Missiles x Around 
World'," The Sunday Herald (Monterey), 10 July 1988): 10A. 



9 
above, has been much more lenient than the United States in 
transferring space-related technology to Brazil and to the rest 
of the Third World. The United States has resorted to diplomacy 
and gentle persuasion in attempting to influence the French 
regarding this matter, but such prodding has been largely 
ineffectual. 

Third, the MTCR fails to apply sanctions against those 
countries that utilize ballistic missiles in combat. Iran and 
Iraq, for example, made wide use of such missiles against each 
other (especially in the 1988 "War of the Cities"), but received 
little more than rhetorical condemnation from the international 
community. 6 

Fourth, the MTCR is resented by many developing countries, 
who consider it an attempt to "freeze" them out of the space or 
ballistic missile club, while MTCR members maintain their space 
programs and their weapons arsenals. Some of these countries, 
such as Brazil, Argentina, and North Korea, have not signed the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and are even less inclined 
to join the MTCR. 



16 For a review of Iran's missiles and a discussion of the 
"War of the Cities," see W. Seth Carus and Joseph S. Bermudez, 
"Iran's Growing Missile Forces," Jane's Defence Weekly 10, no. 3 
(23 July 1988) : 126. See also Stephen D. Goose, "Armed Conflicts 
in 1986, and the Iran-Iraq War," chapter 8 in Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 1987; World 
Armaments and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1987) . 



10 



Fifth, the MTCR cannot control the black market of missile 
technology transfers. It is difficult to estimate the value of 
such transfers, but even minor activity in this realm can 
contribute significantly to the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles. 

Sixth, and last, most of the problems associated with 
implementing the MTCR relate to dual-use technology (civilian 
technology with potential military applications) . The preamble 
to the MTCR states that space technology will not be controlled 
by the regime, unless that technology can also be utilized in 
ballistic missiles. Most peaceful space-launch vehicles have 
inherent military applications. In effect, therefore, the MTCR 
controls much of the technology required for space-launch 
vehicles, a fact that is resented by developing countries with 
space programs. For the suppliers, there is no clear list of 
space technologies that could be diverted to ballistic missile 
programs. That lack of specificity has led to conflicts within 
and between supplier governments. 1 



1 "The one major component of a ballistic missile system that 
is not part of a space system is the reentry vehicle. Therefore, 
the regime includes all items associated with ballistic reentry 
vehicles as Category I items." Frederick J. Hollinger, "The 
Missile Technology Control Regime: A Major New Arms Control 
Achievement," in Daniel Gallik, editor, World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers 1987 , U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Publication 128 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
March 1988) : 26. 



11 



While the ultimate goal of completely halting such 
proliferation remains elusive, the MTCR has succeeded in at least 
slowing the pace ,of ballistic missile development in countries 
where such programs depend heavily on imported technology, such 
as Brazil. 18 The remainder of the report looks at how Brazil has 
managed to press on with the development of a ballistic missile 
in the face of U.S. opposition, under the MTCR framework. 



18 See the statement by Undersecretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Reginald Bartholomew, before the U.S. Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs. Thalif Deen, "U.S. Senator Urges Missile 
Curb," Jane's Defence Weekly . 3 June 1989, 1041. 



12 



II. U.S. POLICY 



A U.S. policy-maker estimated that the U.S. has denied 
Brazil a modest "$5 million to $10 million" in space-related 
products since the MTCR was announced. 19 Nonetheless, the 
importance for U.S. -Brazilian relations of the MTCR-related issue 
may exceed that of broader trade disputes (in the billions of 
dollars) that continue to plague relations between the two 
countries. The space technology issue is especially sensitive 
because it strikes at the heart of Brazil's military and its 
perceived requirements for space and missile programs. Given the 
ongoing influence of Brazil's military elites, the issue may 
prove to be as divisive with the United States as that of nuclear 

• 20 

development in the late 1970s. 



A. Bureaucratic Politics; Competing Views 

Some of the complexities and dilemmas of the U.S. policy 
toward Brazil's space program can be partially understood in 



19 Interview, anonymous, Washington, D.C., 26 June 1989. 

20 See Roger Cohen, "Brazil Fumes at Washington's Refusal to 
Allow Export of Certain Technology," The Wall Street Journal . 27 
April 1989, A13. 



13 
terms of bureaucratic politics. The debate within the U.S. 
inter-agency group that applies MTCR guidelines to Brazil has 
been intense, but largely hidden from the public eye. Briefly, 
there are two maj^or tendencies among U.S. policy-makers 
concerning the transfer of space and missile-related technology 
to Brazil. A relatively small group prefers to withhold 
virtually all such technology from Brazil, while another group 
prefers a more pragmatic, case-by-case policy. The former have 
generally prevailed, and with few exceptions, the U.S. policy of 
transferring space-related technology to Brazil has been one of 
denial . 

All the exceptions to the policy of denial have been items 
within Category II, and most of them have been for Embraer, in 
technologies with no conceivable ballistic missile applications. 
A further exception was made in 1988 with the transfer of a bolt 
used for stage separation in the Sonda IV rocket, after a failed 
test launch of in October 1987. IAE experts, however, suspected 
that the cause of the failed launch was not in the bolt itself, 
but in the equipment utilized in ordering the stage separation. 1 

The policy of strictly interpreting and implementing the 
MTCR guidelines has numerous advantages. It (1) slows Brazil's 



"Controversial ICBM, Other Projects Viewed," (in 
Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo . 21 July 1988, A-24, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-142, 25 July 1988, 34. 



14 
development of ballistic missile technology; (2) links Brazil's 
space and missile programs in realistic fashion (and if it 
commits an error in the process, it errs on the side of caution) ; 
and (3) caters tq moral sensibilities. In addition, such a 
policy is relatively easy to implement consistently, and gives 
its proponents an advantage in bureaucratic battles. In general, 
a uniform policy of denial has the upper hand in such disputes 
because it allows for few, if any exceptions. 

Critics of present U.S. policy contend that in pursuing a 
policy of ballistic missile non-proliferation, the United States 
is (1) antagonizing a traditional ally; (2) eliminating any 
influence over Brazil's alleged missile program; (3) driving 
Brazil further into the waiting hands of the Chinese and Soviets; 
(4) ignoring Brazil's genuine interests in space technology; (5) 
exaggerating Brazil's nuclear capabilities; and (6) failing to 
take advantage of commercial opportunities. Finally, they argue 
that (7) a policy of denial, in a regime in which one is not the 
sole supplier, is ineffective - Brazil "will get there anyway." 

In sum, U.S. policy-makers are faced with a dilemma: to what 
extent can they balance the goal of ballistic missile non- 
proliferation with that of improved U.S. -Brazilian relations? 
There are no easy answers to this question. U.S. policy options 
are rather limited, and reflect decreasing U.S. influence in the 
bilateral relationship and the concomitant rise of Brazil's 



15 
relative autonomy. 



B. U.S. Concerns 

1. Brazil's nuclear program 

U.S. policy-makers have expressed a variety of concerns 
regarding Brazil's missile program. First and foremost, U.S. 
policy-makers fear that Brazil will achieve a nuclear weapons 
capability, and that the technology used to make the space rocket 
could be diverted to manufacture a medium-range ballistic missile 
capable of carrying an atomic bomb. In September 1987 Brazil 
declared that it had mastered the uranium enrichment process and 
observers expect it to have the capacity to build nuclear weapons 
by the late-1990s. Brazil has the world's seventh-largest 
uranium reserves and is already planning to export enriched 
uranium in the next decade. It is developing a nuclear-powered 
submarine, and given the advanced state of its rocketry program, 



22 The concern is shared by a number of nuclear experts. See 
"Brazil Launches Rocket to Height of 350 Miles," Satellite News (8 
May 1989): 6. See also "Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," 
(in Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo . 14 July 1989, G-3, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 August 1989, 28. 



has a lead over Argentina in missile technology 



16 

23 



Brazil's nuclear program has been spurred by Brazil's 
rivalry with Argentina, which has the most advanced nuclear 
program in Latin America. Argentina is now capable of producing 
weapons-grade uranium, and the production of nuclear weapons is a 
matter of political will and financial investment. Brazil's 
program lags behind that of Argentina by only a few years. 

Both Brazil and Argentina refuse to sign the 1968 Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which gives the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the right to inspect 
nuclear installations of the 121 states that ratified the 
treaty. Brazil and Argentina have signed but are not bound by 
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which seeks to make Latin America a 
nuclear-free zone. Such treaties, they argue, are but an 
attempt by nuclear club members to exclude them from the system. 



Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988) . See also 
"South America: Brazil's Nuclear Program," Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Weekly , 13-19 May, 1985, 3. 

24 Both Brazil and Argentina have ratified the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco, but have failed to waive certain conditions that must 
be satisfied before the pact becomes binding on them. See Leonard 
S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988): 235, 259. 



17 
2. Brazil's policy and pattern of arms exports 

A second concern raised by U.S. policy-makers is Brazil's 
arms export policy. Brazil places no "end-user" restrictions on 
arms sales, and allows recipients to retransfer Brazilian arms. 
The Middle East has long been Brazil's major market for arms. 
Iraq was Brazil's largest market in the 1980s, a position held by 
Libya in the late 1970s. U.S. policy-makers fear that Brazil 
might transfer technology or weapons to Libya, Iraq, and others 
in the Middle East. 25 

Brazil's missile and nuclear programs have implications for 
U.S. security concerns in the Middle East and Mediterranean. In 
early 1988, Libya reportedly ordered $2 billion worth of arms 
from Brazil, which had previously suspended the sale of weapons 
to Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi. Brazilian civilian weapons 
manufacturers indicated they could lobby the government of Brazil 
into approving Libya's request, but after heavy pressure by the 
United States, Brazil backed down - at least temporarily. Today, 
Brazil's arms industry is facing a financial crisis and 

26 

desperately depends on additional exports to survive. With the 
termination of the Iraq-Iran confrontation, Brazil lost its 



25 Bradley Graham, "Brazil's Arms Industry Competes Worldwide," 
Washington Post , 2 November 1986, D6 . 

26 "A guerra em marcha a re," Veja, 22 November 1989, 121; 
James Brooke, "Peace Unhealthy for Brazilian Arms Industry," The 
New York Times . 26 February 1990, A4 . 



18 
largest market (Iraq) . As a result, the Libyan market has become 
all the more appealing. 

The coupling, of missiles with chemical or biological weapons 
has not been mentioned by U.S. policy-makers as a major problem 
in relation to Brazil itself. On the other hand, a future 
Brazilian medium-range ballistic missile in the hands of the 
Libyans is an ongoing concern because of its possible chemical 
and biological applications. 27 



3. Brazil's potential threat to regional (Latin 
American) security 

A third concern expressed by some U.S. policy-makers is that 
Brazil could strike almost any point in South America with a 
medium-range ballistic missile. Such a weapon would raise the 
technological level of weapons, fuel an arms race, and generate 
instability in South America. Even more ominously, the coupling 
of Brazil's nuclear program with its missile technology has 
implications for Western Hemispheric security. To date, 



For a discussion of ongoing U.S. concern with Libya's 
alleged production of chemical arms, see Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. 
Intelligence Aides Say Libya is Again Making Chemical Arms," The 
New York Times . 7 March 1990, A-l. 

28 See "In the World: Brazilian Missile Projects," African 
Defence Journal 82 (June 1987): 70. 



19 
Brazilian policy-makers have insisted that the nuclear program is 
for peaceful purposes only, and the 1988 Constitution states that 
nuclear energy must be utilized only for peaceful purposes. The 
very fact that the military is responsible for the nuclear 
program could suggest otherwise. Brazil has no external threat 
from South America and has sought to maintain a low regional 
profile, but its ten South American neighbors will probably be 
monitoring nervously Brazil's missile and nuclear weapons 
programs. 



4. Brazil's potential threat to U.S. security 

A fourth concern is that of Brazil posing a direct threat to 
U.S. security. Brazil could achieve nuclear weapons capability 
by the turn of the century. The coupling of a nuclear weapons 
capability with long-range ballistic missiles could threaten U.S. 
territory, and would raise new issues in hemispheric security 
relations. 



5. Brazil as U.S. competitor 

Finally, it is conceivable that a future Brazilian satellite 
launch capability or ballistic missiles could eventually compete 
with those of the United States in the world market. While such 



20 
a scenario seems unlikely given the advanced state of U.S. rocket 
and missile technology, it is no secret that Brazilian-made 
conventional weapons of low to medium technology are already 
competing with U.S. products. 29 

In summary, U.S. policy-makers are generally concerned most 
with security, and in relation to potential Brazilian missiles, 
express the greatest alarm regarding their relationship to the 
nuclear program (#1) and Brazil's liberal export policies (#2). 
The fear of U.S. policy-makers is that Brazil might sell 
ballistic missiles to a Libya that has achieved nuclear, 
chemical, or biological weapons capabilities. A direct threat to 
the United States (#4) would be of utmost worry if it 
materialized, but this scenario is considered implausible for 
decades to come. There is some concern expressed by U.S. policy- 
makers for regional security (#3), but virtually no mention is 
made of the competition factor (#5). 



29 Some of the best examples include the Osorio , a main battle 
tank produced by Engesa; the Tucano , a trainer made by Embraer; and 
the Astros II . a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) manufactured 
by Avibras. 



21 



III. BRAZIL'S BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAM 

Brazil is only one of a number of developing countries that 
is developing ballistic missiles, and is joined in that pursuit 
by Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Irag, Libya, Pakistan, South Africa, 
and Taiwan. Four other nations, Israel, India, North Korea, and 
South Korea, are already producing such missiles. Several 
countries have received complete missiles from the Soviet Union, 
such as Egypt, Iran, Irag, North Korea, Libya, Syria, and South 
Yemen. Saudi Arabia became the first developing country to 
receive intermediate-range ballistic missiles from the PRC. 

The following section analyzes (a) Brazil's rationale for 
developing ballistic missiles; (b) the space program and its 
relationship to the missile program; (c) Brazil's current missile 
capabilities; and (d) problems facing Brazil's missile program. 



A. Rationale 

Why would Brazil want to seek a ballistic missile 
capability? There are at least four plausible rationales, of a 
(1) political, (2) economic, (3) security, and (4) technological 



30 CRS Report, 2. 



22 
nature. Politically, missiles are one of the supreme symbols of 
national prestige and are virtual preconditions for great power 
status - especially when coupled with nuclear weapons. In a 
South America devoid of major external conflicts, the prestige 
rationale drives much of the arms transfers within the region and 
the missile programs in Argentina and Brazil. In some instances, 
the export of ballistic missiles can be utilized as instruments 
of foreign policy influence. In addition, a ballistic missile 
capability is perceived as a means toward greater autonomy and 
the ability to counter the influence of others. Finally, 
missiles can be used to assert ties with the Third World, through 
trade, licensing, and joint production. 

Second, Brazil's development of ballistic missiles is driven 

by an economic rationale. The new product line could be very 

profitable, as there is significant demand internationally, if 

not domestically, for ballistic missiles. It is estimated that a 

Brazilian missile with a range of 300-1,000 kilometers would cost 

between $2 million and $5 million, and that a satellite launching 

vehicle (VLS) would cost $10 million on the international market. 

Sergio Coeli do Prado, the operations director at Orbita, stated 

that 

Our initial project is to produce the Sonda IV rocket 
for scientific purposes in order to take advantage of 
an interesting nonmilitary market. But, as in any 
military-related industry, we are also studying the 
rocket's military applications, which would involve a 



23 
market of approximately $500 million per year. 31 

At a time when Brazil's armaments industry is reeling from 
the decline in depnand for its weapons (partially a result of the 
end of the Gulf War) , there seems to be a commitment on the 
part of Brazilian policy-makers to support space-related 
ventures to compensate for the poor performance of arms exporters 
in the late 1980s. The Folha de Sao Paulo reported that "It's 
possible that the present combination of internal economic crisis 
and competition on the international market will force the 
domestic companies to march shoulder to shoulder to carve out a 
new niche in the market - in this case, artificial satellites for 
Third World countries." 33 

Third, Brazilian policy-makers may be concerned with 
security. Roberto Godoy, of O Estado de Sao Paulo writes that 
"the purchase of Brazilian-made missiles is part of the 
nationalization and self-sufficiency program the Air Force has 



31 Eustaquio de Freitas, "Tactical Missile Development 
Reported," (in Portuguese), Globo . 3 January 1988, 7, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-002, 5 January 1988, 21. 

32 In 1988, five of Brazil's major arms producers (Avibras, 
Embraer, Engesa, Helibras, and Orbita) experienced major losses, 
as measured by return on net assets, and only two reported gains 
(Bernardini and Vasconcellos) . See J. Okubaro, "Arms Industry Ends 
1988 in Red," (original in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 30 April 
1989, 31; translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-114A, 3-4. 

33 "Joint Space Program Negotiated with Iraq," (in Portuguese) , 
Folha de Sao Paulo . 19 March 1989, C-7 , translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-089, 10 May 1989, 43. 



24 



carried out over the past 10 years." 34 Domestically, Brazil 



requires air-to-air missiles for its 15 Mirage III and 26 F-5E 
fighter-bombers, in addition to the 79 AMX subsonic fighters it 
has on order. Th,e MAA-1 Mol (formerly called the Piranha , but 
renamed in honor of Air Force Minister Octavio Moreira Lima) , was 
designed for such purposes; its cancellation (see below) 
perpetuates Brazil's dependence on external suppliers. While 
none of the above-mentioned missiles fall under the MTCR 
parameters, they illustrate a concern with self-sufficiency that 
could later be applied to ballistic missiles. 

In terms of an external threat, Brazilian policy-makers do 
not perceive an immediate threat from their traditional rival, 
Argentina. Some argue that the Argentine factor is irrelevant 
for Brazil's missile program: both Argentina and Brazil are 
bogged down in domestic economic problems; much of the rivalry 
between the two countries has dissipated; and relations between 
the two countries have never been better. On 8 April 1988, 
Brazilian President (1985-1990) Jose Sarney and Argentine 
President Raul Alfonsin signed the Ipero Declaration on Nuclear 
Policy, which strengthened a previous accord on the cooperation 
of nuclear energy. In addition, the Brazilians and Argentines 
have opened their borders to increased trade, with a list of 524 



"Development of Air-to-Air Missile Reported," (in 
Portuguese), O Estado de Sao Paulo . 7 January 1988, 2, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-008, 13 January 1988, 27. 



tax-free capital goods. 



25 

35 



Despite such good will between the two countries, it is 
quite clear that ( Brazil's military is concerned about Argentina's 
missile capabilities and wants to "keep up with the Argentines" 
as they have in the nuclear sphere. 36 Argentina is developing a 
highly-sophisticated Condor II missile, in cooperation with Egypt 
and Iraq, a program that has been plagued by delays, insufficient 
funding, and the MTCR restrictions. 37 By most accounts, Brazil 
is ahead of Argentina in missile capabilities. Although the 
Argentines have been involved with the research and development 
of missiles longer than the Brazilians, Argentina has an 
infrastructure that is shallower than that of Brazil. 

Fourth, Brazil's quest for advanced technology drives much 
of the space and ballistic missile program. The technology 
rationale is generally underestimated in the literature, but is 



35 "Sarney Extols Cooperation with Argentina," (in Portuguese) , 
Brasilia Domestic Service , 8 April 1988, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-069, 11 April 1988, 35-36. 

36 For a comparison of the Brazilian and Argentine nuclear 
programs, see Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear 
Proliferation (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 
1984) . 

37 U.S. restrictions through the MTCR framework have impacted 
more heavily on Brazil than Argentina. Historically, the United 
States has not cooperated as closely in space technology with 
Argentina as with Brazil. Argentina's missile program has been 
linked primarily with Europe - and as noted above, some European 
suppliers have not been as diligent as the United States in 
imposing MTCR restrictions. 



26 

often cited by Brazilian policy-makers, as exemplified by an 

official note released by the Air Force Ministry in May 1988, 

touting the advantages of the Missao Espacial Completa Brasileira 

(MECB - Brazilian Complete Space Mission) : 

The development of high-level and far-reaching 
technology that will have an incalculable impact on the 
scientific, technological, and industrial sectors of 
our nation. 

The development of national technologies in the 
engineering and electronic sectors, thus contributing 
to the training of manpower that is totally Brazilian, 
and increasing the level of knowledge. 

....the real cost [of developing the VLS] could never 
be evaluated because it would be imbedded in our own 
survival as a free and sovereign nation in the area of 
aerospace technology. 



Finally, it should be noted that the rationales discussed 
above are not mutually exclusive. The economic and technological 
rationales, for example, overlap considerably. In a general 
sense, they all fall under the category of "national security," 
which Brazilian policy-makers define in a broad manner. 



B. Space Program as Precursor 

According to the Congressional Research Service, countries 
can obtain missiles in six ways: 



"Ministry Denies Explosion at Rocket Launch," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia EBN . 16 May 1988, translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-88-097 (Annex), 19 May 1988, 1. 



27 

"1- most of the new missile powers buy or are given 
complete missiles; 

2- a few countries convert short-range missiles into 
longer-range missiles or convert surface-to-air 
missiles into surface-to-surface missiles; 

3- some countries are deriving military missile systems 
from space programs; 

4- some countries are designing and building ballistic 
missiles using dedicated military industrial 
capacity; 

5- more nations are developing, modifying, and 
producing ballistic missiles with technical and 
financial assistance and transfers of components, 
special materials, and information from other 
nations; and 

6- a few countries are apparently taking steps toward 
the development and possible production of cruise 
missiles using aeronautical and electronic 
industries. " 39 



The development of Brazil's missile program has been a 
combination of the above-mentioned strategies: a logical 
progression in the development of its weapons industry (#4) ; a 
product of external assistance (#5) ; an upgrading of existing 
missile technology (#2) ; and an application of civilian 
industries to the possible production of cruise missiles (#6). 
Most important, though, Brazil's missile program has its roots in 
the space program (#3), which provided the necessary, though 
insufficient technological base by which ballistic missiles might 
be produced. 



39 CRS Report, 37. 



28 
The critical link between Brazil's space and ballistic 
missile programs is the satellite launch vehicle (VLS) , which is 
virtually the same for both space and ballistic missile launches. 
A former head of the Centro Tecnico Aerospacial (CTA - Aerospace 
Technical Center) , retired Brigadier (then-Colonel) Hugo de 
Oliveira Piva, stated: "It is obvious that if we have a satellite 
launcher rocket it is relatively easy, although not as easy as 
some may think, to transform this launcher rocket into a 
ballistic missile." He added that the development of this highly 
sophisticated space technology "will make us familiar with those 
techniques that are also used to manufacture weapons." 40 



1. Origins 

Brazil's space program has been directed by the military 
through the Air Force (or Aeronautics) Ministry. The ministry is 
in charge of the CTA, created in 1950 in Sao Jose dos Campos, 
near the city of Sao Paulo. The CTA is involved in research and 
development for the aerospace programs of the Air Force. In 1965 
the Air Force Ministry created the Instituto de Atividades 
Espaciais (IAE - Space Activities Institute) , which is one of 
several institutes within the CTA, and is responsible for 



40 "Officials Comment on Government Nuclear Programs," (in 
Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil . 14 December 1983, 18, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAM-83-245, 20 December 1983, Dl. 



29 
developing rockets. Since its creation, the IAE has tested over 
2,000 rockets. In 1971 the Comissao Brasileira de Atividades 
Espaciais (COBAE - Brazilian Commission of Space Activities) was 
established and p ( laced under the National Security Council. 41 
COBAE is chaired by the head of the Estado Major das Forcas 
Armadas (EMFA - General Staff of the Armed Forces) , and is in 
charge of the MECB. 

On the civilian side, the space program is headed by the 
Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (INPE - National 
Institute of Space Research) , which is roughly the CTA's 
counterpart. Presently, INPE is under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology. 



2. Role of the United States 

The United States played a central role in bolstering 
Brazil's space program, beginning with its financial and 
technological support for the CTA and INPE. In 1966, the United 
States supplied sounding (research) rockets, which were 
subsequently launched by Brazil. Based on that technology, 



41 In 1988 the National Security Council became the Council 
of National Defense (CDN - Conselho de Defesa Nacional ) , a 
transformation in name only. 



30 

Brazil later developed larger boosters of its own. According to 

Captain Clifford P. Graham (U.S. Army) , the ties between Brazil 

and the United States 

were generally along functional lines within the two 
governments: NASA worked with INPE, sharing data, 
helping develop and implement scientific experiments, 
and training the Institute's technicians and 
scientists. Likewise the U.S. Air Force, through the 
Brazilian Ministry of Aeronautics, established and 
maintained a number of data exchange agreements with 
CTA that covered such topics as weather forecasting and 
analysis, and the launching of sounding rockets. 42 



The major objective of the U.S. assistance to Brazil in 
space technology was political - to strengthen bilateral ties 
between the two countries. The economic objective, of having 
something done for the U.S. more cheaply by a local ally, was not 
a major concern. The military objective of cooperation on 
security matters was already covered by a 1952 military 
assistance agreement. 

Brazil no longer relies as heavily on the United States for 
space technology. In 1977, it unveiled the MECB, an ambitious $1 
billion program with the stated goal of attaining self- 
sufficiency in space technology. At that time, Brazil committed 
itself to launching, between 1989 and 1993, a series of four 
Brazilian-made satellites (two for weather forecasting and two 



42 Graham, "The Brazilian Space Program and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Challenges," West Point, New York (United States Military Academy, 
Department of Geography); October 1989; unpublished report, 15. 



31 
for terrain photography) from a 500 square-mile VLS launch 
facility being built at Alcantara, in the northeastern state of 
Maranhao. The Alcantara site, which has already cost over $470 
million, is the world's closest launch center to the equator, 
making it attractive for launches of geostationary satellites. 43 
The Alcantara launch center was officially dedicated on 21 
February 1990. 44 In addition to its indigenous research and 
development, 4 Brazil now cooperates in its space program with 
Canada, the European Space Agency, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and 
France. 46 



The initial reaction of the United States to the MECB was 
muted, as Brazil's space capabilities seemed rather modest at the 
time, and unworthy of undue worry. By the mid-198 0s, with 



4 Alcantara is 2.3 degrees south of the Equator. The Kourou 
launch center in French Guiana is 5 degrees north of the Equator. 
According to Jane's, "Alcantara's position provides a 25 percent 
fuel saving compared with Cape Canaveral." Jane's Spaceflight 
Directory. 1988-89 (Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group 
Inc. , 1988) : 489. 

"President Dedicates Alcantara Launch Center," (in 
Portuguese) , Rede Globo Television, 21 February 1990, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-90-036, 22 February 1990, 34-35. 

45 It was estimated, for example, that 71 percent of the 
equipment utilized in Brazilian satellites is purchased from 
Brazilian companies. "First National Satellite Launch Planned for 
1988," (in Portuguese), Brasilia Domestic Service . 17 October 1988, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-202, 19 October 1988, 31. 

46 CRS Report, 93; and Claudia Bensimon, "Agreement Signed on 
PRC Rocket Technology," (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil . 30 March 
1989, 20, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-062A, 3 April 
1989, 4. 



32 
concern mounting over the security threat of missile 
proliferation in the Third World (and especially in the Middle 
East) , the narrow goal of improved relations with Brazil took a 
back seat to the broader goal of implementing the MTCR in 
consistent fashion. 

Today, U.S. objectives in relation to Brazil's space 
program, as reflected in the MTCR, have changed. Why? 
Politically, Brazil moved away (but not against) the United 
States in the 1970s, as it sought closer relations with many 
Third World countries. In the security sphere, Brazil in 1977 
unilaterally abrogated a 1952 military assistance agreement. 
Economically, Brazil emerged as a competitor to the United States 
in internatonal markets, posting large trade surpluses with the 
United States. 



3. Civilian-Military Role Conflict 

Within Brazil's space program, civilians are primarily 
responsible for satellite production, and the armed forces are in 
charge of developing launch pads and rockets. Despite such a 
division of labor, the armed forces have become the dominant 
actor in the space program. Most of the high-ranking positions 



33 



in the space program are occupied by military officers. 47 COBAE, 
charged with overseeing space policy in Brazil, is a joint 
civilian-military committee, but is headed by a military 
officer. 48 



Brazil's program of missile production is even more 
centralized than the space program in the hands of the armed 
forces. Following a meeting in June 1986 between six companies, 
EMFA, and the three military ministries, missile production was 
placed under the authority of the Comando Geral das Forcas 
Armadas (CMFA - Armed Forces Joint Command) . All missile 
manufacturers are reguired to submit current programs to the 
CMFA, which evaluates them and awards contracts. 

One of the major problems facing Brazil's space program is 
the divided authority between civilian (INPE) and military (CTA 
and IAE) entities, which have had strained relations over the 
past years. In general, the civilians have been more 



47 Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," 
International Security . Winter 1984-1985, 166; "Brazil Pursues 
Dream in Space," The Washington Post , 13 December 1984. 

48 "Brazil Plans to Launch its Own Satellites in 1990s," 
Aviation Week & Space Technology . 9 July 1984, 60. 

49 "Latin America: Centralizing Brazil's Missile Production," 
Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly . 22 June 1986, 2-3. 



34 
internationalist and pragmatic than the military. 50 A 
controversy erupted over the delays experienced by the Air Force 
in producing a VLS by the targeted year, 1989. In March 1988 the 
Air Force announqed that it could not build the VLS prior to 
1992, blaming the delay on the fact that Brazil was no longer 
able to acguire the necessary components because of the MTCR 
restrictions on such technology. In contrast, INPE met the 
deadline in building the first of four satellites to be launched 
by the VLS. 51 

The director general of INPE, Marco Antonio Raupp, was fired 
in January 1989 after he insisted that Brazil contract launching 
services with the United States or another country. Raupp 's 
argument was that Brazil could ill-afford to wait another three 
or four years to place the completed satellite into orbit. 52 
The military countered that in order to meet the goals 
established in the MECB, Brazil must provide the launching 



50 For a review of the debate, see Vinicius Doria, "Alcantara 
Site of a New Rocket Launching Center," (in Portuguese), Brasilia 
EBN, 27 Mary 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-109A, 7 
June 1988, 2. See also Stephane Chenard, "INSCOM: Brazil's Chinese 
Connection," Interavia Space Markets 5, no. 3 (August 1989): 189- 
191. 

51 The estimated cost of developing the Brazilian-made SCD-1 
satellite was over $118 million. The purpose of the SCD-1 
satellite is to collect meteorological information. See Graham 
Warwick, "Satellite Launcher Directory," Flight International , 11 
January 1986, 30; and CRS Report, 90. 

"0 espaco deve ser civil," (interview with Marco Antonio 
Raupp), Veia . 8 February 1989, 5-8. 



35 
vehicle. COBAE recommended that President Jose Sarney refuse to 
authorize the purchase of a foreign rocket to launch Brazil's 
satellite. 53 

i 
In the wake of Raupp's ouster, INPE was nearly transferred 
to the Air Force - a move that would have virtually eliminated 
civilian participation in the space program. 54 Raupp's 
successor, Marcio Nogueira Barbosa, argued against the 
militarization of INPE, claiming that such a move would 
jeopardize cooperative space programs with other countries. 55 



At best, Brazil will be able to launch the VLS in 1992. 



56 



53 In an official note released on 16 May 1988, the Aeronautics 
Ministry stated its position in rhetorical fashion: "What would be 
more important for the country? Delay the schedule and launch our 
own rocket, or import technology and become dependent in a very 
important scientific and technological program that is thoroughly 
linked to the very roots of the nation as a whole?" "Ministry 
Denies Explosion at Rocket Launch," (in Portuguese), Brasilia EBN , 
16 May 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-097 (Annex), 
19 May 1988, 1. See also "Meteorological Satellite Launching 
Postponed," (in Portuguese), Globo . 19 February 1989, 7, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT 89-033, 21 February 1989, 46. 

54 "Transfer of INPE to Military Denied," (in Portuguese), 
Estado de Sao Paulo . 27 January 1989, 10, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-89-036, 24 February 1989, 59. 

55 "New Head of Space Research Institute Appointed," (in 
Portuguese) , Folha de Sao Paulo . 24 January 1989, C-6, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-89-017, 27 January 1989, 30; "Director 
Faces Difficult Year," (in Portuguese), Globo . 29 January 1989, 
34, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-036, 59. 

"Meteorological Satellite Launching Postponed," (in 
Portuguese), Globo . 19 February 1989, 7, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT 89-033, 21 February 1989, 46; "Brazil Shakes Up Space 
Program," Defense News . 13 February 1989, 31. 



36 



4 . Sonda Program 

In order to understand Brazil's potential for developing a 
ballistic missile, one must first look at its forerunner, the 
sounding rocket. According to the Congressional Research 
Service, "Brazil used a stepping-stone approach based on the 
Sonda series of sounding rockets to develop the VLS . The Sonda 
I, II, III, and IV were used to develop and test technologies, 
and components that were used in the successive Sonda rockets are 
to be used in the VLS." 58 [See Table 1] 



57 For a detailed description of Brazil's sounding rocket 
(Sonda) program, see Jane's Spaceflight Directory, 1988-89 
(Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1989): 432. 

58 CRS Report, 90-91. 



37 











TABLE 


1 












SONDA ROCKETS 








i 
Sonda I 


Sonda 
/IIA 


II 


Sonda 


III 


Sonda 


IV VLS 


# Stages 


Two 


One 




Two 




Two 


Four 


Fuel 
Type 


Solid 


Solid 




Solid 




Solid 


Solid 


Payload 
(kg.) 


5 


62 




61 




500 


115/160 


Altitude 
(km) 


100 


180 




600 




600 


750/650 

(circular 

orbits) 


First 
launch 

# Tests/ 
Experi- 
ments 
through 
1989 


1964 
200+ 


N/A 
60 




1976 
23 




1984 

4 


1992 
(est.) 

N/A 



VLS = vehicle launch service 
* through May 1988 

Sources: Compiled from Jane's Spaceflight Directory, 1988-89 
(Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1988): 432; 
Andrew Wilson, editor, Interavia Space Directory. 1989-90 . 
previously Jane's Spaceflight Directory . (Alexandria, Virginia, 
Jane's Information Group, 1989): 310; Snuey, Robert D. , et al., 
Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Report for Congress, 3 
October 1988): 91; Clifford P. Graham, "The Brazilian Space 
Program and U.S. Foreign Policy Challenges," West Point, New York 
(United States Military Academy, Department of Geography) ; 
October 1989; unpublished report, 5-7; Vinicius Doria, "Alcantara 
Site of a New Rocket Launching Center," (in Portuguese), Brasilia 
EBN . 27 May 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-109, 7 
June 1988, 2. 



38 

The VLS employed in the Sondas are solid-propellant systems. 
The Sonda VLS can follow a pre-programmed flight profile, but it 
lacks the sophistication of an inertial guidance system. 59 
Instead, the Sonda IV utilizes a secondary injection system to 
control the direction of thrust and, thereby, the rocket's line 
of flight. This system injects a liquid into the rocket nozzle 
to alter the thrust line of the propulsion without moving the 
nozzle. 60 The Sondas are test-launched from Barreira do Inferno 
(literally, "Barrier of Hell") , near the city of Natal in 
northeastern Brazil. 61 The fourth model of the Sonda IV rocket 
was successfully tested on 28 April 1989. The final launches are 
scheduled from Alcantara, which is closer than Barreira do 
Inferno to the equator, and considered safer because it is 
further removed from large population centers. 



59 Pierre Condom, "Brazil Aims for Self-Suf f iciency in Space," 
Interavia . January 1986, 101. 

60 David Velupillai, "Brazil Joins the Rocket Business," Flight 
International . 6 August 1983, 383-384. 

61 By May 1988, there had been 19 such launch tests for the 
VLS rockets. See Vinicius Doria, "Alcantara Site of a New Rocket 
Launching Center," (in Portuguese), Brasilia EBN , 27 May 1988, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-109, 7 June 1988, 2. 

62 The first full-size test at the Alcantara site is projected 
for 1992. See "Space Agency to Test-Launch Rocket 16 May," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia Domestic Service (radio), 2 May 1989, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-084, 3 May 1989, 41. 



39 
C. Current Missile Capabilities 

What are Brazil's current missile capabilities? Given the 
secrecy that surr,ounds the missile program, there is no easy 
answer to this question. Press reports are contradictory and 
often exaggerate Brazil's capabilities. The following section 
addresses the military applications of Brazil's space program and 
current ballistic missile programs and capabilities. 



1. Military applications of Brazil's space program 

To what extent does Brazil's space program have military 
applications? The Sonda IV s satellite launch vehicle (VLS) 
could serve as the VLS for a ballistic missile in the future. 
The military applications of Brazil's space program, therefore, 
depend less on technological considerations than on political 
will. It should be stressed that the government of Brazil has 
gone on record to support its space satellite launch program, but 
not ballistic missile production. A common argument is that the 
Sonda IV is only a satellite launcher, and lacks the required 
accuracy for military utility. 63 Colonel Antonio Carlos Pedrosa, 
director of the IAE, argues that 



63 "Brazil Pursues Dream in Space," Washington Post . 13 
December 1984, If, 4f; "Third Launch for Brazil's Sonda IV," 
Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly 13, no. 42 (1 November 1987): 4; 
Space Commerce Bulletin 2, no. 23 (6 December 1985): 7. 



40 

Ours is a... civilian program. If the VLS was intended 
for military purposes, it would have to be manufactured 
in numbers, hundreds of them. We will manufacture no 
more than a few units. After all, whom will we attack? 
Our South American neighbors? This does not make 
sense. " 



Some Brazilians make it clear that the military application 
of space-related technology is an option that is being explored, 
especially for its export potential. For example, Vito di 
Grassi, director of Orbita, and Pedro Angelo Vial, the spokesman 
for Avibras Aerospacial S.C., have talked openly about exporting 
Brazilian-made tactical missiles. 

Several measures seem to support the view that Brazilian 
policy-makers are considering the military application of the 
space program. First, most of the rocket technology developed 
since 1965 has been passed on to the country's burgeoning 
armaments industry. Second, as noted above, the space program is 
managed by Brazil's armed forces, which continue to control 
rocket and launch pad development. Third, Brazil has a plant 
that can produce up to 18 tons per day of solid rocket fuel, far 
surpassing the needs of the civilian program. 



64 Mauro Malin, "U.S. Policy Hinders Satellite Program," (in 
Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 6 November 1988, 12, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-217 (Annex), 9 November 1988, 2-3. 

65 "Brazil Pursues Dream in Space," Washington Post , 13 
December 1984, If, 4f. According to Defense News , "Brazil's 
Andrade Gutierrez Quimica produces ammonium perchlorate, the basic 
material from which solid rocket fuel is produced. The firm's new 
$5 million plant can produce 50 metric tons of ammonium perchlorate 



41 



The development of the Sonda IV rocket has provided Brazil 
with the incipient technology to build intercontinental ballistic 
missiles. The Sqnda IV has a range of 600 kilometers and can 
carry a 500 kilogram payload, and is therefore subject to MTCR 
restrictions. 66 Although the Sonda IV is purely civilian, it 
could potentially be converted to an ICBM (inter-continental 
ballistic missile) . The transformation of the Sonda IV into an 
ICBM would reguire several more successful launches and a major 
technological leap, especially in payload shielding and 
guidance. 67 The Sonda IV may be the rocket on which the SS-1000 
(by Avibras) and the MB/EE-1000 (Orbita) are based (see 
discussion of these companies and missiles, below) . The SS-1000 
and the MB/EE-1000 do not exist as of yet, except as some future 
research and design project. 



per year. Its entire output will be used domestically. A second 
plant to produce the chemical for export may be built." See 
"Brazil Produces Solid Rocket Fuel," Defense News 2, no. 30 (27 
July 1987) : 14. 

66 See Jane's Spaceflight Directory. 1988-89 (Alexandria, 
Virginia: Jane's Information Group Inc., 1988): 432; Andrew Wilson, 
editor, Interavia Space Directory. 1989-90 (previously Jane's 
Spaceflight Directory ; Alexandria, Virginia, Jane's Information 
Group, 1989): 310. 

67 "In the World: Brazil to Produce ICBMs," African Defence 
Journal 70 (June 1986): 55. 

68 CRS Report, 92. 



42 
How long would it take Brazil to convert its present VLS 
project into a ballistic missile? Lieutenant Colonel Tiago da 
Silva Ribeiro, deputy director of IAE, argued in 1988 that it 
depends on the perception of threat. Under the present scenario 
of low threat perception, Ribeiro estimates that the conversion 
would take Brazil ten years. In a situation of high threat 
perception, though, the conversion would take between three to 
five years, depending on the level of government commitment. 
Such estimates are probably too optimistic, given Brazil's 
financial and technological bottlenecks. 



2. Current ballistic missile projects 

Brazil has a modest industrial infrastructure and several 
firms that could be mobilized if a future decision were made to 
produce ballistic missiles. 70 The two largest companies involved 
with the production of ballistic missiles are Avibras, the 
traditional producer, and Orbita, the newcomer. 



69 Mauro Malin, "U.S. Policy Hinders Satellite Program," (in 
Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 6 November 1988, 12, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-217 (Annex), 9 November 1988, 2-3. 

For a review of Brazil's current missile projects, see "In 
the World: Brazilian Missile Projects," African Defence Journal 82 
(June 1987) : 70. 



43 
a) Avibras 

Avibras was created as a private aerospace firm in 1961 by 
engineers formerly associated with the CTA. In 1964 Avibras was 
granted the Sonda I rocket contract, and has since been the major 
firm involved with the development of sounding rockets (Sondas 
II, III, and IV). 71 Today Avibras works almost exclusively with 
the manufacturing of rockets and multiple launch rocket systems 
(MLRS) such as the Astros II. It is developing anti-tank 72 and 
anti-ship missiles. 73 Its most famous and profitable product is 
the Astros II, which can launch, with varying ranges, rockets of 
different calibers. The launcher fires SS-30 rockets up to 30 
kilometers, SS-40 rockets up to 35 kilometers, and SS-60 rockets 
up to 60 kilometers. 74 Avibras has sold an estimated 66 Astros 



1 For a review of Avibras and its space activities, see "A 
High-Tech Company with a Clear View to Simplicity," Military 
Technology 13, no. 8 (August 1989): 52-55; "Brazilian Manufacturer 
Cuts Back," Defense News 4, no. 6 (6 February 1989): 33; and John 
Hoyt Williams, "Brazil Reaches for the Stars," The Retired Officer . 
March 1989, 25-30. 

72 "Brazilian Missile," Aviation Week & Space Technology , 28 
August 1989, 11. 

73 Avibras is developing the Barracuda family of anti-ship 
missiles in several versions. A prototype is scheduled to be 
flying in mid-1991. "Barracuda First Flight by 1991," Jane's 
Defence Weekly 11, no. 26 (1 July 1989): 1372. 

74 "Astros II," Defense & Armament Heracles International . 
June 1988, 79. 



44 



II artillery systems to Iraq. 75 In a $200 million contract, 



India reportedly has become the first country outside of the 
Persian Gulf to purchase the Astros II, and will adopt the system 
as standard equipment for its Army. 76 

Avibras is now developinq a series of ballistic missiles. 
The SS-150, with a ranqe of 150 kilometers, was projected to be 
operational by 1987, but may only be available in the early 
1990s. The SS-300, perhaps the most important ballistic missile 
being developed in Brazil, is based on the solid-fuel Sonda IV 
rocket, with an indigenously-designed inertial guidance system. 
It will have a range of 300 kilometers (185 miles) , and will be 
capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram (2,200 pound) warhead. The 
SS-300 missile would be purchased by the Brazilian Army, but its 
major market is likely to be the Middle East. Libya and Iraq 
have already expressed interest in the SS-300. A full-scale 
prototype of the SS-300 has already been completed, but it will 
not be operational until the late-1990s. 



Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the 
Third World, 1971-85 (New York: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 
1987) : Appendix I, 191. 

76 "India, Iraq to Purchase Artillery System," (in Portuguese) , 
Globo . 24 May 1989, 26, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89- 
101, 26 May 1989, 39. 

77 CRS Report, 89-90. 



45 
Some mention has been made of an SS-1000, based on the Sonda 
rocket and with a range of 1,200 kilometers (740 miles). The SS- 
1000, to be designed by the CTA, has yet to be funded. If 
research and development funds were made available and the 
production were effected, the project would be controversial, 
because its expanded payload capability would enable it to carry 
a nuclear warhead. If developed and later sold, such a missile 
in the hands of the Libyans or Iraqis could have serious 
implications for Israeli, U.S., and North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization interests in the region. Furthermore, the SS-1000 
could reach any target in South America from Brazil. No 
timetable has been officially set for the SS-1000, but even if a 
political decision were made to produce the missile, it is 
unlikely that it would become available prior to the turn of the 
century. 8 

All Avibras programs were "put on hold" in January 1990, 
when the company filed for bankruptcy. Its employee roster had 
fallen from 6,000 to 900, and the company had $90 million worth 
of unsold rockets - largely a result of the end of the Gulf 
War. 79 The bankruptcy underscored the vulnerability of Brazil's 
arms industry and its potential ballistic missile program. 



78 Jack Anderson, "Brazilian Missiles," The Herald (Monterey), 



28 March 1988, 18. 

79 

James Brook 
The New York Times . 26 February 1990, A4 . 



79 James Brooke, "Peace Unhealthy for Brazilian Arms Industry," 



46 



b) orbita 

In the mid-1980s, Brazil's armed forces became frustrated by 
delays in the development of self-guided missiles. Following the 
June 198 6 meeting between private industry and the military, a 
consensus was reached that standardization was necessary in 
missile production. As a result, a new firm, Orbita Sistemas 
Aerospaciais S.A., was created in February 1987 to coordinate 
Brazil's missile program. It is owned by Engesa ( Engenheiros 
Especializados S.A. - 40 percent) , Embraer ( Empresa Brasileira de 
Aeronautica S.A. - 40 percent) , Esca ( Engenharia de Sistemas de 
Controle de Automacao S.A. - 11 percent) , Imbel ( Industria de 
Material Belico do Brasil - 5 percent) , and Parcom ( Participacoes 
e Consultoria - 4 percent) . orbita was tasked with developing 
guided missiles as well as rockets and satellite launchers for 

81 

civilian applications. 

Orbita inherited the MB/EE-150 project from Engemissil, a 
subsidiary of Engesa. As a result of Orbita 's financial 



"Programa brasileiro de misseis sera unificado," Globo , 
2 June 1986; "Latin America: Centralizing Brazil's Missile 
Production," Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly 12, no. 22 (22 June 
1986) : 2-3. 

"Brazil Founds Launch Company," Satellite News , 2 March 
1987, 3. 



47 
constraints, the MB/EE-150 has not been developed, nor is it 

• • • 82 

under active research and development at this point. The 
MB/EE-150 was to have been only the first in a series of 
missiles, including the MB/EE-350 (with a 350 kilometer range) , 
the MB/EE-600 (600 kilometers), and the MB/EE-1000 (1,000 
kilometers) - all based on the Sonda series of experimental 
rockets. 83 

Orbita is also developing two new missiles: the MSS-1 Leo, 
an anti-tank missile developed with Italy's 0T0 Melara, and the 
MSA-1, an anti-tank missile of shorter range than the Leo. 84 The 
company has been modernizing the Seacat shipborne surface-to-air 
missiles, purchased from Great Britain in the mid-1970s. 85 These 
projects, however, have been seriously hampered by a severe 
shortage of funds, and by Engesa's precarious financial 
condition. 



82 The Congressional Research Service describes the MB/EE-150 
in its projected form as "a mobile tactical missile, fired from a 
dual-launcher chassis, and capable of carrying a 1,100 pound (500 
kilogram) warhead to a range of 90 miles (150 kilometers) . It will 
have inertial guidance, and some reports say it will also have 
terminal homing guidance that will allow it to be directed to a 
target with great accuracy." CRS Report, 89. For further 
description of the MB/EE-150, see "Brazilian Defense: Full Speed 
Ahead," Defense & Foreign Affairs 15, no. 3 (March 1987): 33-35. 

83 CRS Report, 89. 

84 "Nouveaux missiles francaises et etrangers: 3 nouveaux 
missiles bresiliens," Air et Cosmos 1149 (27 June 1987): 82. 

85 "Navy Planning to Upgrade Seacat Missile," (in Portuguese), 
Estado de Sao Paulo . 9 September 1988, 5, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-176, 12 September 1988, 35. 



48 



A third missile, the Mol, had its funding reduced in mid- 
1988, 86 and was eventually cancelled in August 1989 because of 
budget constraints. The Mol was initially projected in the late 
1970s. The CTA was responsible for its development until 1986, 
when it was handed over to Engesa. In 1987, Orbita was given 
control over the missile. The Mol would have been an air-to-air 
missile designed for the F-5E of the Brazilian Air Force and the 
AMX subsonic fighter (co-produced with Italian firms) , and would 
have competed with the Sidewinder (U.S.A.) and Magic (France) on 
the international market. The cancellation of the Mol is 
significant because of the high priority the missile had been 
accorded by the Brazilian Air Force. Now Brazil will purchase 
air-to-air missiles from either France, the United States, 
England, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Israel, or the Soviet Union. 66 

Today Orbita is virtually defunct, with no manufacturing, 
products, or sales, and little, if any actual research and 
development. It is all but a shell of an organization that has 



Roberto Lopes, "Ministry Cuts Money for Air-to-Air Missile," 
(in Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo , 1 July 1988, A-4 , translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-128, 5 July 1988, 26. 

Joaquim Monteiro, "Lacking Funds, Air Force Retires 
Piranha," (in Portuguese), Correio Braziliense , 6 August 1989, 16, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-191, 4 October 1989, 37. 
The Mol became a victim of budget cuts as early as 1988, when the 
Air Force was denied the $25 million requested for the project. 
See "Piranha Missile Programme Loses Government Funding," African 
Defence Journal 96 (August 1988): 45. 



49 
generated substantial press in an attempt to obtain funding for 
research and development. Its survival may depend on Engesa's 
financial resurrection. While Orbita may indeed be "Brazil's 
NASA" (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) of the 
future, it is Avibras that will continue to lead Brazil's 
ballistic missile program into the coming century, assuming that 
Avibras can survive its current crisis. 



D. Problems Facing Brazil's Missile Program 

Brazil is facing a number of pressures in the development of 
its space and ballistic missile programs. They are related to 
(1) technological constraints; (2) U.S. restrictions; and (3) 
inadeguate funding. Any one of the problems would be serious; 
the combination of the three has nearly crippled Brazil's space 
and ballistic missile ventures. 



1. Technological Constraints 

The complexities involved in a ballistic missile capability 
are staggering. For example, Brazil's satellite launch vehicle 
is a four-stage rocket with seven engines, 70,000 different 
components, and 8,000 meters of electrical wiring. At launch it 



50 
stands 18.8 meters tall, and weighs 50 tons. 67 Given such 
technological intricacies, what is it that Brazil needs to 
further develop its space and missile programs? 

i 
The list of bottlenecks in Brazil's missile program is long, 
and includes technology that is related to at least the following 
categories: re-entry vehicles, fuel components, stage separation 
devices, telemetry, and stabilizing and roll systems. Early 
tests of the Sonda IV rocket were plagued by failures in stage 
separation. In the long run, the most important bottleneck is 
likely to be guidance systems. 

A related problem is that of guestionable technological 
choices made by Brazil. Some technicians who previously worked 
at the IAE have complained about "technical errors" in 
their project. One error cited was that of the configuration of 
the first stage of the rocket, which consisted of four engines, 
thereby reguiring a volume of steel three times larger than would 
have been necessary for a single, more powerful engine. The 
additional steel means that the first stage weighs considerably 
more, and reguires added fuel - all of which pose greater 



6 Jane's Spaceflight Directory, 1988-89 (Alexandria, Virginia: 
Jane's Information Group Inc., 1988): 432; Andrew Wilson, editor, 
Interavia Space Directory, 1989-90 , previously Jane's Spaceflight 
Directory (Alexandria, Virginia, Jane's Information Group, 1989) : 
310; "Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," (in Portuguese), 
Folha de Sao Paulo . 14 July 1989, G-3 , translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 August 1989, 29. 



51 



• 68 

difficulties in engineering design. A second error cited by 



the technicians is the use of solid fuel instead of liquid fuel, 
which is generally considered more effective for ballistic 
missiles. 69 



2. U.S. Restrictions 

Closely related to Brazil's technological bottlenecks is the 

fact that its traditional supplier, the United States, has 

restricted most of the requested technology for the space and 

missile programs, since the signing of the MTCR in 1987. The 

impact of such denials was immediate and severe. Captain 

Clifford P. Graham describes some of the initial restrictions: 

Particularly hard hit were CTA's requests for technical 
assistance related to the SONDA rocket program. A 1987 
Brazilian request for wind tunnel specifications, 
submitted under the CTA-USAF [U.S. Air Force] data 
exchange agreement, was denied by the U.S. due to MTCR 
constraints. Simultaneously at the national level, the 
U.S. Department of State denied a Brazilian request for 
the purchase of two MIDAS platforms like those already 
acquired for the October launch of the SONDA IV. 



68 • • 

A related problem is one of industrial capabilities. Brazil 
lacks the facilities to build turbines over one meter in depth. 

69 "Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," Folha de Sao Paulo , 
14 July 1989, G-3 , translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 
August 1989, 30. It could be argued that the use of solid fuels 
is not an error. According to the CRS Report (page 15) , "Solid 
fuels are safer and easier to handle than liquid fuel but contain 

less energy per pound of propellant. It is also more difficult to 
control the rate and pattern of combustion of solid fuels. . . .Liquid 
propellants generally offer greater thrust per pound of 
combustibles than solid propellants. But some liquid propellants 
are very corrosive and unstable." 



52 

Shortly thereafter, Brazilian telemetry equipment which 
had been purchased in the United States prior to the 
MTCR, was seized and held for over a year by the U.S. 
Government when the Brazilians returned it to Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida, for repair by the manufacturer." 70 

In addition, while the United States previously supplied 

technology related to guidance (through Space Vector, of 

California) , it would do so no longer. The United States also 

denied all requests for technology related to re-entry vehicles, 

fuel components and stage separation devices. 



The following examples illustrate the problems created for 
Brazil by such denials, and the subsequent attempt to gain such 
technology from other suppliers: 

(1) A launch of Brazil's Sonda IV rocket, scheduled for 
16 December 1988, was postponed because of problems 
with the inertial navigation system, which was 
originally purchased from Space Vector in the United 
States. The U.S. government prohibited Space Vector 
from repairing the navigation equipment; as a result, 
Brazil turned to Ferranti, of Britain. 72 

(2) The U.S. embargo of components for the inertial 
platform slowed the CTA's efforts to develop the VLS. 



70 Graham, "The Brazilian Space Program and U.S. Foreign Policy 
Challenges," West Point, New York (United States Military Academy, 
Department of Geography); October 1989; unpublished report, 15. 

71 Rik Turner, "Brazil Says Missile Technology Controls Hamper 
Launch Industry," Defense News 4, no. 30 (July 24, 1989): 18. 

72 Roberto Lopes, "Ministry Announces Sonda-4 Rocket Launch 
Delay," (in Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo , 24 November 1988, C- 
6, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-229, 29 November 1988, 
30. 



Eventually, the CTA found "other suppliers 



53 

,73 



(3) The Air Force Ministry reported that because of 
U.S. restrictions on technology related to altitude 
guidance and the control of rockets, it would seek out 
the PRC and the Soviet Union. 74 

i 

(4) The United States turned down a Brazilian contract 
offered to Honeywell for guidance systems. Barbosa, 
the head of INPE, claimed that the IAE would seek to 
gain such technology from "other sources, like 
China." 75 



There is no doubt that U.S. restrictions on the export of 

components necessary for the development of Brazil's VLS have 

harmed both Brazil's satellite launch program as well as its 

potential, though undeclared ballistic missile program. In 

August 1989 the Folha de Sao Paulo summarized the impact of U.S. 

restrictions on VLS technology: 

The U.S. boycott has been so intense that even 
nonsensitive equipment for aeronautical use has been 
denied IAE. But what has been most detrimental to the 
development of the VLS is the ban on electronic 
components for control of the vehicle and engineering 
services. In the area of propulsion for the rocket, 
which will use solid fuel, the boycott has not had such 
a serious effect. Developing the components that are 
lacking in the country will take time and have a high 
cost. 76 



73 Eustaquio de Freitas, "Tactical Missile Development 
Reported," (in Portuguese), Globo 3 January 1988, 7, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-002, 5 January 1988, 21-22. 

74 Ibid . 

75 "INSCOM: Brazil's Chinese Connection," Interavia Space 
Markets 5, no. 3 (August 1989): 191. 

76 "Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," (in Portuguese), 
Folha de Sao Paulo . 14 July 1989, G-3, translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 August 1989, 29. 



54 



The timing of U.S. denials of space technology to Brazil was 
very important, for they came at a particularly critical moment 
in the development of Brazil's VLS. Colonel Antonio Carlos 
Pedrosa, director of the IAE, estimated in November 1988 that the 
U.S. restrictions on VLS technology had cost Brazil $8.4 million. 
According to Pedrosa, the U.S. government denied three requests 
made by U.S. suppliers for exports to Brazil, forcing Brazil to 
turn to European suppliers and increasing the cost from $6 
million to $14.4 million. The U.S. denials not only increased 
the cost of VLS development, but they also delayed the first 
launch of the VLS for at least two years. At the time of 
Pedrosa's statement (November 1988) , Brazil was still awaiting 
the approval, by European governments, of the requested 
components. 7 



3. Inadequate funding 

Brazil, the developing world's largest debtor with an 
external debt of over $110 billion, and an annual (1989) 
inflation rate of 1,765 percent, faces severe economic and 



77 Mauro Malin, "U.S. Policy Hinders Satellite Program," (in 
Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 6 November 1988, 12, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-217 (Annex), 9 November 1988, 2-3. 



55 



financial crises. 78 Budget constraints have hindered the 



aerospace program considerably, despite the privileged status of 
the space sector. The cost of INPE's four satellites was 
initially projected at $900 million, but INPE has received only 

80 

40 percent of those funds. Of the $600 million scheduled to be 
disbursed to the IAE for the manufacture of the VLS by 1989 (as 
stipulated 10 years earlier by COBAE) , the agency received only 
$170 million through July 1989. It is estimated that Brazil will 
need to spend another $170 million prior to the first launch of 

81 • 

the VLS. It is also estimated that Brazil must invest $2 
billion over the 1990s to establish an indigenous satellite 

82 

communications system. 



78 

Thomas Kamm, "Daily Inflation Struggle Obsesses Brazil," 
The Wall Street Journal . 29 January 1990, A12 . For a review of 
political and economic events in Brazil in 1989, see Riordan Roett 
and Scott D. Tollefson, "The Year of Elections in Brazil," Current 
History 89, no. 543 (January 1990): 25-29, 42. 

79 One of the few projects to escape the budget axe was that 
of remote sensoring. "Experts Discuss Remote Sensoring Programs," 
(in Portuguese), Brasilia RDB . 12 October 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-199, 14 October 1988, 3. 

80 A separate estimate, by the Jornal do Brasil , places the 
cost (to date) of the first generation of Brazil's satellites at 
$300 million. This includes the construction of the launching 
installation system, maintenance, insurance on eguipment, etc. 
"Embratel Studies Bids for New Satellites," (in Portuguese) , Jornal 
do Brasil . 26 March 1989, 34, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
89-058 (Annex), 28 March 1989, 12. 

81 "Brazil Says Missile Technology Controls Hamper Launch 
Industry," Defense News 4, no. 30 (July 24, 1989): 18. 

82 . • 

"Brazil to Develop Satcom System," Defense Daily 164, no. 
36 (22 August 1989): 291. 



56 
In January 1989, as part of a broader economic adjustment 
program dubbed "the Summer Plan," the VLS budget was cut by 55 
percent. The chief of the VLS program, engineer Jayme Boscov, 
claims that current funds only guarantee the agency's "vegetative 
existence." Brazil has been forced to suspend contracts with 
foreigners (especially France) and to cut back on the contracting 

83 

of engineering services. Furthermore, many highly specialized 
researchers and technicians working on the missile program at CTA 
have left for better-paying jobs in private industry. 



Conclusion 

In effect, Brazil occupies a third tier of ballistic missile 
producers. Its missile capabilities are modest in comparison to 
those of the superpowers and most major powers, but sophisticated 
in relation to those of most developing nations. The CRS 
provides a tentative assessment of Brazil's capabilities: 

It appears likely that short-range systems are probably 



"Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," (in Portuguese), 
Folha de Sao Paulo , 14 July 1989, G-3, translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 August 1989, 29. See also "Sonda IV Missile 
to be Test Fired on 15 April," (in Portuguese), 2 April 1989, 36, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-071, 14 April 1989, 38. 

84 Boscov and Aviator Lieutenant Colonel Tiago da Silva Ribeiro 
estimated that over 150 of CTA's 4,000 employees left between 1987 
and 1989. About half of these were "highly specialized." See 
"Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," (in Portuguese), Folha de 
Sao Paulo . 14 July 1989, G-3, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
89-156, 15 August 1989, 30. See also "Baixos salarios levam a 
evasao de especialistas, " Folha de Sao Paulo . 8 October 1987. 



57 



in an advanced stage of development but have not been 
put into production. The development and testing of 
longer-range missiles is probably constrained by the 
lack of key foreign-made components and perhaps by 
insufficient testing of short-range systems on which 
the bigger missiles will be based. 85 



In sum, Brazil's ballistic missile program, facing 
formidable constraints, is largely in the pre-planning stages and 
not under serious research and development. It seems that 
Brazil's long-term potential for developing ballistic missiles is 
greater than that suggested by current capabilities, which are 
severely limited. 



85 CRS Report, 88. 



58 



IV. BRAZIL'S RESPONSE: SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SUPPLIERS 

Brazil's movement away from the United States in the realm 
of space and ballistic missile technology is part of a consistent 
and broad redefinition of Brazil's foreign policy that began as 
early as 1967 with the emergence of the hard-line and 
ultranationalist wing of Brazil's military under President 
(General) Artur Costa e Silva. That movement away from the 
United States culminated in the mid-1970s with the German nuclear 
accord and Brazil's abrogation of the military assistance 
agreement with the United States. In addition to a reorientation 
of relations with the United States, that redefinition included 
an approximation with the Third World and a search for 
ideological neutrality. 

Much of the tension in U.S. -Brazilian security relations 
stems from conflicting notions of national security. Whereas the 
United States has emphasized security concerns in a primarily 
military vein, Brazil is driven by a broader definition of 
security, one that includes the notion of self-sufficiency, which 



86 

For a broader discussion of Brazil's foreign policy, see 
Riordan Roett and Scott D. Tollefson, "Brazil's Status as an 
Intermediate Power," Third World Affairs 1986 : 101-112. 



59 
includes technological and economic factors. The conflicting 
definitions of national security reflect different positions 
within the international system. The United States, as a 
superpower and leader of the Western alliance, is concerned about 
global implications of missile proliferation. In contrast, 
Brazil, as a developing state and "free rider" in search of major 
power status, seeks to take advantage of commercial and 
technological opportunities to develop satellite launches and a 
possible ballistic missile capability. 

Brazilian authorities have strongly criticized the strict 
implementation of MTCR guidelines by the United States. For 
example, the chief of the VLS program, engineer Jayme Boscov, 
complained: "The fact is that the U.S. doesn't want to see Brazil 
make technical progress in space." As a result of this view, 
the issue of U.S. restrictions of space technology to Brazil has 
become a greater irritant in U.S. -Brazilian relations than the 
nuclear issue, which has been absorbed by policy-makers in both 
countries, who have come to accept the fact that neither Brazil 



87 • • • 

There is evidence that this may be changing, and the United 
States may be moving closer to Brazil on this dimension. Currently 
there is a debate in the United States over the extent of U.S. 
military equipment being manufactured overseas, which some argue 
threatens self-sufficiency. 

go t 

"Brazil Fumes at Washington's Refusal to Allow Export of 
Certain Technology," The Wall Street Journal . 27 April 1989. 

89 "Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," (in Portuguese), 
Folha de Sao Paulo . 14 July 1989, page G-3, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 August 1989, 28. 



60 
nor the United States will easily budge on the nuclear issue. 

Given the U.S. restrictions on MTCR-related technology, what 
are Brazil's options? First, Brazil could choose to "go it 
alone." Brazil has shown that it is capable of designing and 
producing sophisticated weapon systems, such as the Astros II. 
Brazil's long-term goal is self-sufficiency, but it will be 
required to seek technology from abroad, given the technological 
complexities of producing rockets or ballistic missiles. The 
costs of "going it alone" are simply overwhelming, in light of 
budgetary constraints. This suggests that complete autonomy in 
rocket or missile technology is an impractical, if not impossible 
goal for Brazil. 

Second, Brazil could choose to restore a close relationship 
with the United States in the area of space and missile 
technology. Indeed, many Brazilian officials continue to prefer 
U.S. space and missile technology. Some Brazilian scientists 
involved with the space program have studied in the United 
States, and are familiar with its techniques; they too are 

• • 90 

frustrated by having been denied the space technology. The 



90 • 

Pedrosa lamented that "Behind the U.S. veto lies a 
technological dispute, and not even over advanced technology. The 
United States refuses to transfer 20-year-old technology, [and] 
even this causes us great harm." Mauro Mai in, "U.S. Policy Hinders 
Satellite Program," (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil . 6 November 
1988, 12, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-217 (Annex), 9 
November 1988, 2-3. 



61 
minimum U.S. preconditions for such a restoration in technology 
transfers would be the signing of agreements that preclude the 
re-transfer of such technology without U.S. approval. Brazil 
has shown that it ( is unwilling to limit its autonomy in this 
manner. Citing sovereignty concerns, Brazil has not allowed for 
international supervision of its nuclear program, and it is 
unlikely that it would agree to similar oversight of its space 
rocket programs. Under the new president, Fernando Collor de 
Mello, this may change. President Collor de Mello has suggested 
that Brazil may sign the NPT, as part of a broader 
internationalist developmental model. 

Brazil's third and most promising option is that of seeking 
diversified suppliers of technology and financing. Some, 
especially within the Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) , 
see this as a major opportunity for Brazil to break its 
dependence on the United States in such a sensitive area, and to 
strengthen ties with other suppliers. Given the lack of 
international consensus on the diffusion of ballistic missile 
technology, Brazil can take advantage of multiple suppliers of 
space and missile technology without excluding the United States 
as a source. The following section discusses some of the leading 
supplier alternatives for Brazil. 



62 
A. MTCR Signatories 

Brazil's most promising alternative suppliers of space and 
missile technology are among the MTCR members, especially France. 
Brazil also cooperates on space matters with the FRG, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada, but has yet to establish such links with 
Italy and Japan. 91 Outside of the MTCR community, Brazil has 
pursued space technology ventures with the PRC, the Soviet Union, 
Iraq, Libya, and to a minor extent with Sweden and Switzerland. 



1. France 

France has emerged as Brazil's major alternative to the 
United States in supplying space technology to Brazil. This 
parallels the French position as Brazil's largest supplier of 
major conventional weapons from 1981-1985 [see Table 2]. In 
August 1989 the Folha de Sao Paulo reported that in contrast to 
the Americans, with their restrictions on the transfer of missile 



91 It should be noted, however, that Brazil (via Embraer) has 
cooperated closely with Italy in the development and construction 
of the AMX subsonic fighter, and in purchasing missiles for the 
AMX. Brazil also cooperates with the European Space Agency (ESA) 
in tracking ESA rockets fired from Kourou, in French Guiana. The 
ESA is a consortium of nine countries, in which France (65 percent) 
and the FRG (25 percent) are the largest shareholders. Brazil 
charges $100,000 for each tracking. See Vinicius Doria, "Alcantara 
Site of a New Rocket Launching Center," (in Portuguese), Brasilia 
EBN, 27 May 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-109A, 7 
June 1988, 2. 



63 
technology, "the French have not been so inflexible. Space 
cooperation with France is by now traditional." 92 



92 "Obstacles to VLS Development Reviewed," (in Portuguese), 
Folha de Sao Paulo . 14 July 1989, G-3, translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-156, 15 August 1989, 29. 



64 



TABLE 2 

Shares of Major Suppliers in Brazil's Imports of Major 
Conventional Weapons, 1951-1985 











Suppl: 


Ler 
























Total 


Period 


USA 


France 


UK 


FRG 


Italy 


Third 
World 


Other* 


in 1985 
US $m. 


1951-55 


83 


- 


17 


- 


- 


- 


- 


405 


1956-69 


68 


5 


25 


- 


- 


- 


2 


600 


1961-65 


92 


1 


5 


- 


- 


- 


2 


496 


1966-70 


58 


1 


12 


- 


- 


- 


29 


473 


1971-75 


76 


6 


9 


3 


7 


- 





1,996 


1976-80 


27 


7 


62 





4 


- 


1 


2,547 


1981-85 


14 


36 


_ 





35 


9 


6 


178 



*Does not include the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of 
China, neither of which has supplied Brazil with any major 
weapons 



Source: Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the 
Third World, 1971-85 (New York: SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 
1987): Appendix 7, 340. 



65 

Brazil is negotiating with France to receive the Viking 
liquid-fuel rocket engine technology. The Viking engine is the 

first stage of Europe's Ariane launcher. The United States has 

i . , 
protested the sale, arguing that it violates the MTCR, and that 

such technology could eventually reach radicals or terrorist 

nations via Brazil. 93 

Other examples of space cooperation with France include 
Brazil's purchase of guidance systems from SAGEM. France is 
also providing expertise and technical assistance for building 
the Alcantara launch site. 95 In addition, the Brazilian base at 
Barreira do Inferno tracks the French Ariane rockets launched 
from Kourou, in French Guiana. 96 

France made a bid to launch two Brazilian telecommunications 
satellites (Brasilsat B) on its Ariane 4 rocket. Under the $210 
million contract, France reportedly proposed to transfer 



93 "Government Negotiating to Buy Ariane Engine," (in French), 
Paris Domestic Service , 17 July 1989, translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-140, 24 July 1989, 49. 

94 CRS Report, 93. 

95 "Le Bresil prevoit de lancer ses 4 premiers satellites en 
1989-99," Air et Cosmos 1147 (13 June 1987): 197, 199; "Brazil 
Founds Launch Company," Satellite News . 2 March 1987, 3; Gilbert 
Sedon, "France-Brazil Space Deal Attacked," Flight International . 
12 August 1989, 17. 

"Center Announces Successful Tracking of Ariane," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia EBN . 15 June 1988, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-118 (Annex), 20 June 1988, 1. 



66 
sensitive rocket motor technology in an offset arrangement. The 
U.S. company competing for the contract was McDonnell Douglas 
(Delta 2 rocket), which turned to the U.S. government for 
support. McDonnell Douglas claimed that because of France's more 
liberal export policy, the company was at a disadvantage in the 
competition. 7 

Indeed, many U.S. policy-makers are frustrated with France's 
more liberal transfer of space technology to Brazil. The United 
States has exerted, with some success, diplomatic pressure on 
France in order to restrict the transfer of such technology. 
Nonetheless, U.S. policy-makers grudgingly admit that France is a 
logical source of space technology for Brazil. 

There are, however, limits to what France will transfer to 
Brazil. The Viking liquid-fuel rocket engine technology 
mentioned above is over 20 years old, and pales in comparison to 
some of the newer technology that Brazil would like to receive 
from the United States. Concerned with Brazilian arms exports to 
Libya, the French have openly criticized Brazil's export policy. 
Jacques Boyon, French secretary of state to the minister of 
defense, warned in a visit to Brasilia that the sale of ballistic 
missiles has grave implications for the exporter, and cited his 



97 "Brazilian Satellites," Aviation Week & Space Technology , 
21 August 1989, 15; "McDonnell Douglas, Hughes Battling for 
Brazilsat 2 Deal," Space Commerce Bulletin . 28 July 1989, 2-4. 



67 
country's policy of requiring end-use certification in 
transferring such technology. 98 



2. The Federal Republic of Germany 

Some U.S. policy-makers claim that the FRG is even more 
liberal than France in transferring Category II items. The FRG 
has been extensively involved in Brazil's nuclear program, but 
has not participated as broadly as France in Brazil's space 
program. It has helped Brazilian engineers develop rockets that 

• 99 

provide the basis for the development of a future launcher. 
Germany has also utilized Barreira do Inferno to launch 
experimental rockets. Germany is constrained, though, in that it 
too must buy launching services from others, 100 and because of its 
history of closer collaboration with Argentina, Brazil's 
traditional rival. 



98 • • 

"French Defense Secretary Meets Officials," (in Portuguese) , 
Brasilia EBN . 8 March 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
88-047 (Annex), 10 March 1988, 1. 

99 "Brazil Founds Launch Company," Satellite News . 2 March 

1987, 3. 

100 h FRG to cooperate in Rocket Launching," (in Portuguese), 
Brasilia Domestic Service , 8 August 1988, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-153, 9 August 1988, 32; "Skylark Rocket Successfully 
Launched 4 Sep," (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil . 4 September 

1988, 17, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-175, 3. 



68 
3 . United Kingdom 

Britain's participation in Brazil's missile program has been 
extremely limited^ British Aerospace has assisted Orbita in the 
production and launching of a land-to-air high-velocity missile. 
These shoulder-fired missiles are targeted for low-flying 
aircraft and helicopters. 10 The U.K. has been more restrictive 
than France or the FRG in interpreting the MTCR, and it is 
unlikely that the U.K. will increase significantly its ties with 
Brazil in this sensitive area. 



4 . Canada 

Canada has been a major participant in the Sistema 
Brasileiro de Telecomunicacoes para Satelite (SBTS - Brazilian 
System of Satellite Telecommunications) , the first domestic 
satellite system in Latin America. Under license from Canada's 
Spar Aerospace, Brazil built the Brasilsat 1 (launched 8 February 
1985) and Brasilsat 2 (launched 28 March 1986) , which are fully 

• 102 • • • • • 

operational. Currently, Spar is bidding against Hughes (United 
States) for the follow-on contract for a new generation of 



101 "Brazilian MSAAV High Velocity Missile Developed," African 
Defence Journal 89 (January 1988): 33. 

102 • 

For a description of the Brasilsat program, see Jane's 
Spaceflight Directory, 1988-89 (Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's 
Information Group Inc., 1988): 631. 



69 



satellites, dubbed Brasilsat B. 103 Canada's role in Brazil's 



space program has been primarily limited to satellites, and it is 
unlikely that Canada will become a major player in the 
development of Brazil's VLS or ballistic missile program. 



B. MTCR Non-Sianatories 



1. People's Republic of China 



Brazilian officials have shown a certain fascination with 
"pursuing the China option." The PRC offers liquid-fuel 
technology, a proven launch capability, and expertise in rocket 
or missile guidance systems. In turn, Brazil presents solid-fuel 
technology, 105 an equatorial launch site, 106 abundant natural 



103 "Spar Aerospace Outbids Hughes for Brazilsat Replacement," 
Satellite News . 10 April 1989, 7; "Brazilian Satellites," Aviation 
Week & Space Technology . 21 August 1989, 15; "Embratel Studies Bids 
for New Satellites," (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil . 26 March 
1989, 34, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-058 (Annex), 28 
March 1989, 12. 

104 See, for example, "Sarney Comments on Meeting with PRC's 
Li Peng," (in Portuguese), Brasilia EBN . 4 July 1988, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-131, 8 July 1988, 1. 

105 Aeronautics Minister Moreira Lima has stated that Brazil 
and the PRC are studying an exchange that would involve the 
transfer of liquid propellants to Brazil. "Air Force Chief 
Comments on Objectives," (in Portuguese), Estado de Sao Paulo . 
6 April 1989, 17, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-067, 10 
April 1989, 36. 

106 CRS Report, 93. 



70 
107 • 

resources, computers, and conventional weapons. As early as 

• . 1 Oft 

1985, Brazil sought PRC technology for satellite launches. 
Brazil and the PRC signed a nuclear agreement in 1984, but it was 

109 • 

never implemented^ They signed a second nuclear accord on 14 
January 1988, for industrial cooperation in developing reactors 
and other nuclear projects, 110 under IAEA supervision. 111 



When it became evident that the MTCR restrictions on space 
technology would delay the launch of Brazil's VLS, the PRC became 
an even more attractive alternative. 112 Marco Antonio Raupp, for 
example, claimed that with Chinese assistance in rocketry, Brazil 
could put into orbit satellites that could compete 
internationally with the Landsat (United States) and Spot 



"PRC Interested in Informatics Cooperation," (in 
Portuguese), O Globo . 3 November 1988, 25, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-233, 5 December 1988, 49. 

1 DM 

Brazil also showed an interest in purchasing the Y-7 two- 
engine troop transport plane. "Air Force Interested in Purchasing 
PRC Planes," (in Portuguese), Brasilia EBN . 28 June 1988, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-124 (Annex), 28 June 1988, 
1. 

109 • • • 

"Foreign Minister on PRC Nuclear Policy," (in Portuguese), 
O Globo . 7 July 1988, 6, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88- 
133, 12 July 1988, 21-22. 

110 "Scientists Skeptical About PRC Nuclear Accord," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia Domestic Service , 19 January 1988, 25, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-017, 27 January 1988, 25. 

111 "IAEA to Supervise Nuclear Accord with PRC," (in Spanish), 
Madrid EFE . 16 January 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
88-012, 20 January 1988, 35. 

112 Stephane Chenard, "INSCOM: Brazil's Chinese Connection," 
Interavia Space Markets 5, no. 3 (August 1989): 191. 



71 
(France). 113 In July 1988, President Sarney and a high-profile 
entourage 114 visited the PRC and signed eight governmental 
treaties, in an attempt to expand trade, 115 military links, 116 and 
technical cooperation with the PRC. 117 According to Brazil's 
Minister of Foreign Relations Abreu Sodre, the most important of 
the treaties signed in July 1988 was the agreement on the 



113 "0 espaco deve ser civil," (Interview with Marco Antonio 
Raupp) , Veia . 8 February 1989, 5-8. A separate and unconfirmed 
report claimed that Brazil and China will develop an earth imaging 
satellite, to be launched on a Long March booster in 1992. Brazil 
will contribute $85 million, of which $45 million has already been 
approved. Brazil will be able to utilize 3 percent of the 
satellite's services. "China, Brazil to Develop Earth Imaging 
Satellite," Aviation Week & Space Technology . 7 March 1988, 29. 

114 The group included Foreign Minister Roberto de Abreu Sodre, 
Air Force Minister Octavio Moreira Lima, Military Household Chief 
General Rubens Bayma Denys, Irrigation Minister Vicente Fialho, 
Agrarian Reform Minister Jader Barbalho, Science and Technology 
Minister Luiz Henrique da Silveira, and six congressmen. "Sarney, 
Entourage to Leave for PRC on 3 June," (in Portuguese), Brasilia 
Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network . 28 June 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-125, 29 June 1988, 21. 

115 Trade with the PRC had fallen from $1.2 billion in 1985 to 
$620 million in 1987. "Foreign Minister Comments on Trade with 
PRC," (in Spanish), Madrid EFE . 3 July 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-128, 25. 

116 For example, Brazil assigned a military attache to China, 
in hopes of strengthening ties between the two countries. "Abreu 
Sodre Comments on Upcoming Trip to PRC," (in Portuguese) , Brasilia 
EBN, 23 April 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-083, 29 
April 1988, 5-6; "Foreign Minister: PRC Trip Results x Positive'," 
(in Portuguese) , Brasilia Domestic Service . 9 May 1988, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-090, 10 May 1988, 24. In addition, 
Brazil explored the possibility of jointly producing "defensive 
weapons" with the PRC. "Foreign Minister Comments on Trade with 
PRC," (in Spanish), Madrid EFE . 3 July 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-128, 5 July 1988, 25. 

117 "Sarney Returns from Official Visit to PRC," (in 
Portuguese), EBN . 10 July 1988, translated and reported in FBIS 
LAT-88-134, 13 July 1988, 4. 



72 
construction and launching of two satellites to explore natural 

118 

resources. 



The Chinese contract was mired in controversy in Brazil. 
INPE pressed for an early test of its satellite and favored a 
foreign (including Chinese) launch. The IAE, CTA, Air Force 
Ministry and Armed Forces staff feared that a major contract with 
the PRC would reduce funds for the Sonda IV program, thereby 
undermining the MECB goal of self-sufficiency. The conflict was 
eventually settled with the participation of President Sarney, 
who hoped that the satellite would be placed in orbit prior to 
the end of his term in March 1990. 119 According to Roberto 
Lopes, of the Folha de Sao Paulo , Brazil's government "adopted a 
Solomonic attitude to meet both demands: It authorized an accord 
with the PRC, and assured the military that neither the Sonda IV 

• 120 

nor the VLS projects would be discontinued. 1 ' 

Under the agreement, INPE cooperates with CAST (Chinese 



118 "Foreign Minister Comments on Trade with PRC," (in 
Spanish), Madrid EFE , 3 July 1988, translated and reported in FBIS 
LAT-88-128, 5 July 1988, 25. 

119 Mauro Malin, "U.S. Policy Hinders Satellite Program," (in 
Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 6 November 1988, 12, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-217 (Annex), 9 November 1988, 2-3; see also 
Eustaguio de Freitas, "Government Indecision Imperils Space 
Leadership," (in Portuguese), O Globo , 5 December 1988, 10, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT 89-014, 24 January 1989, 40. 

1?0 . • • 

"Controversial ICBM, Other Projects Viewed," (in 

Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo . 21 July 1988, A-24, translated 

and reported in FBIS LAT-88-142, 25 July 1988, 34. 



73 
Academy for Space Technology) in designing remote sensing 
satellites that collect information for agriculture, mineral 
prospecting, and cartography. Brazil funds 3 percent of the 
$170 million program. 121 In 1992, two data collection satellites 
were to be launched on the Chinese Long March 2C rocket from 
southern China, followed by two remote sensing satellites in 
1994. President Sarney claimed that INPE was cooperating with 
CAST in order to "together, break the [developed countries'] 
monopoly of high technology." 122 

On 19 February 1989 Avibras (30 percent) and China Great 
Wall Industrial Corporation (CGWIC, 70 percent) formed 
International Satellite Communication (Inscom) in order to sell 
satellites, launch vehicles, earth stations, and antennas, as 



121 In the long term, Brazil was expected to contribute $100 
million to the project, a price tag that would have been $300 
million with a western country. See "Resource Satellite to be 
Built with PRC," (in Portuguese), O Globo , 21 December 1989, 30, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-247, 27 December 1989, 43. 

122 The quote is from "Brazil, PRC to Launch Satellites in 
1992," (in Portuguese), Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia 
Network . 22 April 1988, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-081, 
27 April 1988, 36. See also Stephane Chenard, "INSCOM: Brazil's 
Chinese Connection," Interavia Space Markets 5, no. 3 (August 
1989): 189-191; "Details of Satellite with PRC Disclosed," (in 
Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo , 6 July 1988,) A-7, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-132, 11 July 1988, 35; "Minister on 
Satellite PRC to Build for Country," (in Portuguese), Brasilia 
Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network . 29 June 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-126, 30 June 1988, 26-27; "Satellite 
Project with PRC Discussed," (in Portuguese), O Estado de Sao 
Paulo . 14 October 1988, 11, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
88-225, 22 November 1988, 33; "Plan to Build Satellite with PRC 
Approved," (in Portuguese), Globo . 29 February 1988, 5, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-041, 2 March 1988, 24. 



74 
well as to market three versions of the Chinese Long March 
booster and the Brazilian VLS. In addition, Inscom will market 
launch facilities and services in both countries. The joint 
venture between Brazil and the PRC takes advantage of the 
complementary nature of their respective space programs. Avibras 
is noted for its earth station construction, while CGWIC offers a 
proven launch capability. Furthermore, the PRC hopes to gain 
access to the Alcantara launch site. 123 

On 27 March 1989, Brazil's Elebra Eletronica and the 
government of the PRC signed an agreement for technological 
exchange leading to the construction of the Long March III 

1 ?£ 

satellite-launching rocket. China's Precision Machinery Import 
and Export already builds the Long March II rocket. The 
agreement, which included Brazilian exports of aluminum iron, 
steel plates, and other products, was estimated to have been 
worth $2 billion. 125 



123 "Financial Focus: Brazil, China Enter Satellite Launch 
Pact," Defense News 4, no. 19 (8 May 1989): 33; "Brazil, China Form 
Space Launch Venture," Aviation Week & Space Technology 130, no. 
22 (29 May 1989): 35; "Brazil/PRC Joint Venture," Interavia Air 
Letter (6 June 1989): 10; Stephane Chenard, "INSCOM: Brazil's 
Chinese Connection," Interavia Space Markets 5, no. 3 (August 
1989) : 189-191. 

124 Roberto Lopes, "Space Vehicle Scheduled for Launch in 
November," (in Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo , 17 July 1988, A- 
30, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-138, 19 July 1988, 34. 

125 CRS Report, 90; Claudia Bensimon, "Agreement Signed on PRC 
Rocket Technology," (original in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 30 
March 1989, 20, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-84-062a, 3 
April 1989, 4-5. 



75 



Despite the flurry of agreements signed between Brazil and 
the PRC in the late 1980s, there has been only limited 
collaboration bet,ween the two countries. 126 First, Brazil's 
budget cuts have hindered cooperation with the PRC. For example, 
the launching of the first satellite was postponed 15 months 
because of Brazil's delays in making its contribution of $6 
million that was due in 1989. Second, Brazilian technicians, 
trained in the West, are less than enthusiastic about Chinese 
technology. Third, the PRC's liquid fuel technology will render 
all solid fuel programs (such as Sonda) irrelevant, making it 
expensive to "change in mid-stream." Based primarily on 
technical considerations, Brazilian officials decided in 1989 
against the Long March option. 

Brazil is also aware that a closer relationship with the PRC 
could elicit negative feedback from the United States and other 
MTCR signatories. For the United States, Brazilian-Chinese 
cooperation is of greater concern than Brazilian-French 
collaboration, because of the PRC's non-aligned status and its 
recent transfer of sophisticated ballistic missiles to the Middle 



126 For example, a team from INPE of 21 scientists and 
technicians went to PRC to work for two months with the PRC Academy 
of Space Technology, in Beijing. 

127 "Resource Satellite to be Built with PRC," (in Portuguese) , 
Globo . 21 December 1989, 30, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
89-247, 27 December 1989, 43. 



76 
East. Brazil's reluctance to seek closer ties with the PRC 
seems, though, to reflect technological and not political 
considerations. The Air Force Chief of Staff, Lieutenant 
Brigadier Cherubim Rosa Filho, when asked about Brazilian-Chinese 
space programs, answered flatly: "A long time ago ideology 
stopped being an impediment to armament deals." 



2. Soviet Union 

Rapprochement between Brazil and the Soviet Union began in 
1986 with the visit to Moscow of Foreign Minister Olavo Setubal, 
which was reciprocated in 1987 by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze. In September 1988, Brigadier Cherubim Rosa Filho 
became the first Brazilian military officer to pay an official 
visit to the USSR. 129 In October 1988, President Jose Sarney 
became the first Brazilian head of state to visit the Soviet 
Union. His entourage included Army Minister Leonidas Pires 



1 28 • • • 

"Air Force Chief Comments on Objectives," (original in 
Portuguese), Estado de Sao Paulo , 6 April 1989, 17, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-89-067, 10 April 1989, 36. 

129 Brigadier Cherubim Rosa Filho was chief of the General Air 
Command (COMGAR) , and was accompanied by Brigadier Socrates da 
Costa Monteiro, deputy Air Force chief of staff. "Air Force 
Commanders to Tour Bases in USSR," (in Portuguese), O Globo , 19 
August 1988, 6, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-163, 23 
August 1988, 20. 



Goncalves and Navy Minister Henrique Saboia. 



77 

130 



Prior to Sarney 's trip, Brazil and the Soviet Union had 
limited cooperation in space and atmospheric research. 131 During 
the trip, the two countries signed ten documents that 
strengthened bilateral ties in the fields of trade, science, 
technology, culture, and space. 132 The space accord called for 
cooperation in space research, the exchange of scientists and 
scientific data, and the utilization of launch vehicles and 
launching centers. 1 More important, Minister of Science and 
Technology Ralph Biasi claimed that the accord opened the way for 



130 "Army, Navy Ministers to Visit USSR with Sarney," (in 
Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo 25 September 1988, A-4 , translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-189, 29 September 1988, 18. 

131 • • • 

For example, the Physics Institute of the Campinas State 
University (UNICAMP) and the Soviet Union cooperated in the 
launching of over 100 stratospheric balloons in 1988, in an effort 
to study cosmic rays. See "Scientific Cooperation Accord with 
USSR," (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil . 28 February 1988, 18, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-042 (Annex), 3 March 1988, 
1. In a separate study, INPE, the Moscow Science Institute, and 
several Brazilian universities cooperated on atmospheric research. 
See Eustaquio de Freitas, "Joint Atmospheric Research with USSR 
Begins," (in Portuguese), O Globo , 3 April 1988, 8, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT 88-065, 5 April 1988, 25; "Cooperation with 
Soviet Space Projects Planned," (in Portuguese), Folha de Sao 
Paulo . 16 March 1988, A19, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88- 
053, 18 March 1988, 30. 

132 "Sarney Visit to Result in Accords with USSR," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia RDB . 13 October 1988, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-199 (Annex), 14 October 1988, 1. 

133 Dilze Teixeira, "Space Cooperation Accord Signed with 
USSR," (in Portuguese), Correio Braziliense . 20 October 1988, 21, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-218, 10 November 1988, 24- 
26. 



78 
the transfer of Soviet technology in the areas of guidance 
systems, fuels, and rocket propulsion. In return, the Soviet 
Union was especially interested in Brazilian technology in 
computers and maqhinery manufacture. 134 According to Biasi, the 
accord was "more encompassing than that signed with China at the 
end of August this year [1988], which is limited to the 
development of satellites." 135 

The signing of a space cooperation accord with the Soviet 
Union raised the question of its implications for Brazilian-U.S. 
relations and the prospect of U.S. retaliation. In three 
separate statements justifying the accord, Brazilian policy- 
makers asserted Brazil's sovereignty and growing autonomy vis-a- 
vis the United States: 

The national policy in this area of scientific and 
technological development - and this includes 
information systems and automation - is autonomous, and 
for that reason, we are free to make any accord with 
the Soviet Union or any other country. [Biasi] 



"Soviets Interested in Computer Joint Ventures," (in 
Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 22 September 1988, 18, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-186 (Annex), 26 September 1988, 1; 
"USSR Interested in Brazilian-Made Computers," (in Portuguese), 
Veia , 20 April 1988, 39, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88- 
078, 22 April 1988, 23; "Technology Exchange with USSR 
Contemplated," (in Portuguese), O Estado de Sao Paulo , 3 June 1988, 
21, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-111, 9 June 1988, 32; 
"Soviets to Buy Brazilian Automation System," (in Portuguese), 
Globo . 17 July 1989, 17, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89- 
137, 19 July 1989, 59. 

135 Dilze Teixeira, "Space Cooperation Accord Signed with 
USSR," (in Portuguese), Correio Braziliense , 20 October 1988, 21, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-218, 10 November 1988, 24- 
26. 



79 

There could be a retaliation by the U.S. government, 
but this is natural... When a country begins to grow, 
it threatens the space of others. What we cannot do is 
remain linked to the United States forever. [Minister 
of Foreign Relations, Abreu Sodre] 

We are ,not members of any political or military bloc; 
therefore we are sovereign in establishing relations 
with whatever nation, in accordance with our 
interests.... Brazil is exercising the sovereign right 
to have complete relations with the entire world. 
[President Jose Sarney] 136 

Both Sodre and Sarney stated that closer ties with the Soviet 

Union did not mean that Brazil was moving against the United 

States. 



Brazilian policy-makers argue that they are seeking Soviet 
assistance not as a first option, but as a response to MTCR 
restrictions on the transfer of space and missile technology. In 
1988 Brigadier Cherubim Rosa Filho stated that Brazil was seeking 
Soviet space technology because "the countries which claim to be 
our friends are not transferring technology to the Brazilian 
space program. ... if those countries refuse to supply this 
technology, there are new friends who will." 13 In May 1989 he 
reiterated his position: "We want to improve our knowledge of 
rocket-guidance systems and liquid fuels.... If our traditional 



136 Dilze Teixeira, "Space Cooperation Accord Signed with 

USSR," (in Portuguese), Correio Braziliense . 20 October 1988, 21, 

translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-218, 10 November 1988, 24- 
26. 

"Officer Views Space Cooperation with USSR," (in 

Portuguese), Brasilia RDB . 12 September 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-179 (Annex), 15 September 1988, 1. 



80 
partners, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
others, refuse to transfer their space technology, we will try to 

• • • • • • 1 "5ft 

obtain it from countries with different ideologies." 

i 
For the Soviets, increased space cooperation with Brazil is 
viewed as a means to compensate for the trade imbalance with 
Brazil. From 1983-1987 the Soviets had a $2 billion deficit in 
their trade with Brazil. Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that the Soviets, sensing that they had lost out on a good 
opportunity for cooperation with Brazil, were unhappy with the 
earlier Brazil-PRC accord to launch two observation satellites. 139 

In fact, there has been only modest activity generated by 
the Brazilian-Soviet space accord. Brazil is participating in 
the Soviet Mars Phobos project. Brazil's National Institute of 
Space Research will coordinate Brazil's work in the Soviet 
Union, 140 and the Radio-Observatory Network will track the 
project's two probes. In addition, Brazil will participate with 
the Soviets in the Aktivny project to study the ionosphere and to 



138 The statement was made prior to a visit by Marshal 
Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yefimov (commander in chief of the Soviet 
Air Forces and Deputy Defense Minister) to Brazil between 14-20 
May 1989. "Soviet Air Force Delegation to Visit 14-20 May," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia RDB , 4 May 1989, translated and reported in 
FBIS LAT-89-088A, 9 May 1989, 10. 

"Soviet Official to Discuss Trade, Cooperation," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia EBN , 10 March 1988, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-052 (Annex), 17 March 1988, 1. 

uo Space Commerce Bulletin 20, no. 1 (2 January 1987): 10. 



81 
grow semiconductor crystals. In exchange, the USSR will gain 
access to Brazilian facilities for meteorological balloon 
launches. 

i 
In 1989, Soviet meteorological radar and 1,300 anti-hail 

rockets were purchased at a cost of $2 million by Brazilian 

businesses with support from state and federal governments, 

including INPE and the ministries of the Army, Air Force, and 

Science and Technology. The radar, used for providing 

information on meteorological conditions, was installed in Lebon 

Regis, Santa Catarina, and the rocket launcher were installed in 

nine locations throughout the state. 

In the final analysis, U.S. policy-makers express only 
limited concern regarding the Brazilian-Soviet space cooperation. 
Indeed, there seems to be little likelihood that Brazilian-Soviet 
space cooperation will be enhanced significantly in the immediate 
future. Brazil's military is suspicious of the Soviets, and 



141 "Brazil is Participating in Soviet Union's Mars Phobos," 
Space Commerce Bulletin 4, no. 5 (27 February 1987): 10. 

142 "Soviets to Install x Unique' Meteorological Radar," (in 
Portuguese), Brasilia RDB . 29 November 1988, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-88-234 (Annex), 6 December 1988, 6; "Soviet 
Meteorological Radar Taken to Site," (in Portuguese) , Brasilia RDB . 
1 February 1989, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-024 
(Annex), 7 February 1989, 6; "Soviet-Made Anti-Hail Rockets 
Installed," (in Portuguese), Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia 
Network . 26 June 1989, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-122, 
27 June 1989, 28; "Soviet Experts to Install Weather Equipment," 
(in Portuguese), Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia , 17 July 1989, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-136, 18 July 1989, 55. 



82 
seems wary of developing a stronger relationship in this area. 
Likewise, the Soviets have guarded their missile technology from 
most of the developing world, preferring to sell entire missile 
systems rather than transferring such technology. Finally, many 
Brazilians, such as Celso Amorim, special secretary for 
international affairs of the Science and Technology Ministry, 
have expressed dissatisfaction with the Soviet cooperation 
agreements. They prefer the Chinese space program because of its 
complementary nature, and because the Chinese are more willing to 
transfer their technology. 144 To a certain extent, therefore, 
Brazilian policy has been to pit the Soviets against the Chinese, 
and to "play the China card" when necessary. 

It is unclear what the cataclysmic changes in the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc may herald for Brazilian-Soviet space 
cooperation. In the short term, they may hinder cooperation, as 
the Soviets look increasingly inward. In the long term, it is 
possible that a reformed Soviet Union may be looked upon with 



143 For example, Army Minister Leonidas Pires Goncalves and 
Aeronautics Minister Brigadier Moreira Lima expressed deep 
reservations concerning the exchange of military attaches with 
Moscow. Moreira Lima added that "when we have to decide between 
sending military attaches to the PRC or to the Soviet Union, we 
will choose to send them to the former country, where we have more 
immediate interests." 

144 Chico Mendonga, "Relations with PRC, Soviet Union 
Evaluated," (in Portuguese), Jornal do Brasil , 17 July 1988, 27, 
translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-138 (Annex), 19 July 1988, 
1. 



83 
greater confidence by Brazil's military, thereby bolstering 
collaborative ventures. 

i 
3. Iraq 

In December 1989 Iraq shocked the intelligence community 
when it announced that it had test-fired a three-stage rocket 
capable of placing satellites in orbit. Iraq has exploited 
loopholes in the MTCR and rapidly gained the technology necessary 
to become a missile producer. Since 1984, it has participated 
with Argentina and Egypt in developing the Condor II, a two-stage 
ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear and chemical 
warheads. The Condor II has a range of up to 1,24 miles - 
clearly within target of every major city in Israel, if fired 
from Iraq or Egypt. Only Saudi Arabia's CSS-2 has a longer range 
(1,674 miles); Israel's Jericho II has a 930-mile range. 145 

As noted above, Iraq has traditionally been Brazil's largest 
market for armaments exports. Iraq and Brazil may expand their 
relationship and jointly develop satellites, missiles, and 
rockets. 146 In exchange for Brazil's technology and training, 



145 Ed Blanche, "Western Companies Help Arm Iraq," The Sunday 
Herald (Monterey, CA) , 28 January 1990, IB, 5B. 

146 It was reported that Brazil would export the MAA-1 Mol (or 
Piranha) missile to Iraq for its combat planes, but the Mol project 
was cancelled by Brazil in August of the subsequent year. See 
"Orbita to Export N Smart' Missiles to Iraq," (in Portuguese), 



84 

Iraq would provide much of the financing for such programs. 147 

The Iraqis are especially interested in the SS-300 missile, and 

may be partially funding that program. According to one report, 

the SS-3 00 could be a direct copy of the Soviet SS-1 Scud B that 

Iraq may have supplied to Brazil. In March 1989 Globo 

reported that Brazil and Iraq 

may join in a wide-ranging program of scientific and 
technological cooperation to train Iraqi engineers and 
researchers, and to develop aircraft, rockets, 
satellites, and weapons. .. .As of now, the most 
promising part of the program is the joint development 
of satellites and missiles. ... Iraq is also interested 
in acquiring technologies relating to rockets and 
missiles capable of launching satellites, and is 
disposed to finance part of the Brazilian Space Program 
in exchange for the technology. 



Iraq negotiated with INPE and Embraer to build military 
reconnaissance satellites, in a project similar to Brazil's first 
satellite, used for remote sensoring. For Embraer, the deal was 
reportedly worth $80 million, and may have represented its first 
attempt to directly enter the satellite business (as a major 



Globo , 2U December 1988, 24, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
89-014, 39. 

147 "Avibras Negotiates New Accord with Iraq," (in Portuguese) , 
O Globo . 22 February 1989, 21, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
89-060, 30 March 1989, 31; "Brazil, Iraq to Develop Rockets 
Jointly," (in Portuguese), Globo . 19 March 1989, 46, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-89-065, 6 April 1989, 51. 

148 "Arms Expert [Aaron Karp] Says Iraq Can Obtain Ballistic 
Missiles," Reuters, 15 December 1987. 

149 "Brazil, Iraq to Develop Rockets Jointly," (original in 
Portuguese), O Globo . 10 March 1989, p. 46; translated and reported 
in English in FBIS LAT-89-065, 6 April 1989, 51. 



85 
partner in orbita, Embraer was already involved indirectly in 
satellites) . Embraer may also have been seeking to penetrate 
Iraq's market, with an eye toward future sales of its Tucano 
trainer and AMX subsonic fighter. Itamaraty, fearing U.S. 
sanctions through the MTCR, denied that VLS technology would be 
transferred to Iraq. Embraer President Ozilio Silva, a vocal 
supporter of the Iraqi deal, confirmed that negotiations on the 
subject were moving forward, but added that "Itamaraty does not 
want these negotiations to appear as if they involve a rocket 
technology transfer, because they, in fact, do not involve 

««« ii150 

one . " 

According to the Folha de Sao Paulo , a contract worth $4 
million is being negotiated between Brazil and Iraq. Under the 
contract, Brazil would sell Iraq a satellite called "Satellite-X" 
at INPE because of its secretive nature. Brazil won the contract 
over the PRC and France because it was the only bidder to offer 
to exchange technology. Under the contract, INPE initially will 
train Iraqi technicians in Brazil. Eventually, Brazil will 
transfer, for $50 million, the technology necessary for Iraq to 



Roberto Lopes, "Itamaraty Opposes Iraqi Satellite 
Construction," (in Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo , 7 April 1989, 
G-3, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-89-067, 10 April 1989, 
35-36; see also Stephane Chenard, "INSCOM: Brazil's Chinese 
Connection," Interavia Space Markets 5, no. 3 (August 1989): 191. 



build its own laboratories for building and testing satellites. 



86 

151 



In June 1989, Brazil offered to sell a military observation 
satellite to Iraq,, and discussed the possibility of selling a lab 
for manufacturing and testing satellites. 152 In the aftermath of 
the Gulf War, and the cancellation of Iraqi purchases of 
Brazilian armaments, Brazil is more than willing to expand its 
relationship with Iraq. It will do so cautiously, with the 
awareness that such ties could provoke U.S. reprisals. 

Iraq is likely to continue to be Brazil's largest market for 
conventional armaments, despite the 1988-1990 downturn in Iraqi 
demand. Iraq has expressed an interest in the licensed 
production of Embraer's EMB-312 Tucano. 153 In 1989 Iraq 
negotiated a $500 million contract to purchase Astros II multiple 



151 "Iraq to Purchase INPE Satellite, Technology," Folha de 
Sao Paulo . 5 March 1989, A-10, translated and reported in FBIS LAT- 
89-043, 7 March 1989, 40-41. Engesa and Brigadier Hugo de Oliveira 
Piva (retired) led the negotiations. Engesa was expected to 
subcontract INPE to build the satellite. 

152 "Government Offers to Sell Satellite to Iraq," (in 
Portuguese), Folha de Sao Paulo . 19 June 1989, A-8, translated and 
reported in FBIS LAT-89-119, 22 June 1989, 34. 

153 According to OESP . Embraer and Iraq were secretly 
negotiating a licensing agreement whereby Iraq could manufacture 
40 Tucano EMB-312 trainers. The cost would be $100 million. Iraq 
now operates 80 such planes that were built by Egypt. A single 
plane is worth approximately $1.9 million. The contract includes 
components and support materials. "Iraq Wants License to 
Manufacture Tucano Planes," (in Portuguese), O Estado de Sao Paulo , 
7 December 1988, 20, translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88-238, 
12 December 1988, 35. 



87 
rocket launchers and SS-60 rockets. The contract terms, with new 
grace periods, were reportedly generous to Iraq. 15A 

Iraq's major, problem is financing such deals. It owed 
Avibras $40 million for an earlier sale of the Astros II, and 
Avibras suspended the shipment of arms. In February 1989 Iraq 
agreed to pay Brazil the first installment on its debt, leading 
to the resumption of arms deliveries. In a separate case, Iraq 
owed Engesa $80 million on a sale of military vehicles, but paid 
that debt in October 1988. Iraq's ongoing financial 
constraints limit the potential for Iraqi-Brazilian cooperation. 

Iraq, Egypt, and Brazil are studying the possibility of a 
tripartite agreement on the production of the FLX, a supersonic 
pursuit plane that has been in the design stage by Embraer since 
1987. Egypt and Iraq have already participated with Brazil on 
the Tucano project; they have 14 Tucanos between the two of the 
them (built in Egypt) . The major problem with the FLX project is 
its cost. Cuts in government budget have put the project on 



154 "More Brazilian Arms for Iraq," Defense & Foreign Affairs . 
February 1989, 39; Avibras Negotiates New Accord with Iraq," (in 
Portuguese) , Globo , 22 February 1989, 21, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-89-060, 30 March 1989, 31. 

155 A Brazilian government guarantee of Iraq's debt also 
contributed to the resumption of deliveries and the subsequent 1989 
contract. 

156 "Brazil Negotiates Rocket Sales to Iraq," Defence 20, no. 
2 (February 1989): 83; "Brazilians Talk Rockets in Baghdad," 
Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly 15, no. 5 (12 February 1989): 1. 



88 
hold. It is estimated that Brazil needs at least $2 billion for 
the project, and that 350 to 500 planes must be sold in order to 
make it feasible. The air forces of Iraq and Egypt have 
demonstrated a willingness to invest in the FLX, but no agreement 
between them has been reached to date. 15 The pattern of 
interaction between Brazil, Iraq, and Egypt, on the FLX project 
could be significant for future cooperation in space and 
ballistic missile programs. 



4 . Libya 

Most worrisome for U.S. policy-makers is Brazil's 
relationship with Libya. In the late 1970s, Libya was Brazil's 
largest armaments customer. In 1983, Brazil suspended arms sales 
to Libya, in large part because of ongoing U.S. pressure. Under 
a February 1988 proposal, Libya offered to purchase $2 billion 
dollar worth of Brazilian armaments. Libya also offered Orbita 
$400 million a year for six years to help develop the MB/EE 

1 58 

series of surface-to-surface missiles, an offer that was 



157 Roberto Godoy, "Iraqi, Egyptian Interest," (in Portuguese), 
Estado de Sao Paulo . 22 October 1989, 29, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-89-242, 19 December 1989, 42. 

158 • 

"Libya Offers to Finance Brazilian Missile Project," Jane's 
Defence Weekly 9, no. 5 (6 February 1988): 201; "While Libya Brings 
a Shopping List," Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly 14, no. 4 (7 
February 1988): 2; "High Level Libyan Military Delegation Visits 
Brazil," African Defence Journal 91 (March 1988): 7; "Brazil Offers 
Libyan Missile," Flight International 134, no. 4132 (24 September 
1988): 9; "Libyan Military Mission Discussing Arms Deal," (in 



89 



confirmed by orbita. In addition to financing the program and 
purchasing the first lot of the series, a Libyan delegation 
expressed an interest in gaining access to the MB/EE technology. 
At the time, it was estimated that it would take five years to 
develop the MB/EE series. 160 Given the desperate financial state 
of most Brazilian arms producers at the time, the Libyan offer 
seemed attractive. Under intense U.S. and international 
pressure, though, Brazil backed off from such arrangements with 
Qaddafi. Such pressure will continue to limit the scope of 
Brazilian-Libyan interaction. 



C. Others 



Brazil has been involved on a lesser scale with other 



Portuguese), Globo . 21 January 1988, 21, translated and reported 
in FBIS LAT-88-015, 25 January 1988, 22; Roberto Lopes, "Weapons 
Manufacturers Seek Libyan Sales," (in Portuguese), Folha de Sao 
Paulo . 17 July 1988, A-9 , translated and reported in FBIS LAT-88- 
138, 19 July 1988, p. 32. See also James Tomashoff and Lewis A. 
Dunn, "Some Implications of a Changing Third World Military 
Environment," Paper prepared for the Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) Conference on the Changing 
Dimensions of the Third World Military Environment, McLean, 
Virginia, 20 June 1989, 18. 

"Libya Said Financing Missile Construction," (in 
Portuguese), Rede Globo Television , 3 February 1988, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-023, 4 February 1988, 32. 

160 Roberto Godoy, "Offers Missile Development Aid," (in 
Portuguese), Estado de Sao Paulo . 22 January 1988, 2, translated 
and reported in FBIS LAT-88-015, 25 January 1988, 23. 



90 
suppliers of space and missile technology. It sought Swedish 
cooperation on a guidance panel that was originally developed by 
the Japanese. In addition, Avibras received technology from 
Switzerland's Oer ( likon-Buehrle for the fieldguard system (called 
FILA in Brazil - Fighting Intruders at Low Altitudes) , which 
makes the steering of missile artillery possible. Brazil 
probably will continue to seek out small suppliers of space and 
missile technology, but in the long run, will depend more on the 
larger suppliers such as France and the PRC. Finally, Japan's 
ongoing development of its space program augurs well for 
Brazil. 163 Cooperation with the Japanese in space technology 
would not carry the political liabilities associated with the 

1 AA 

Soviets or Chinese. 

In sum, Brazil has sought a wide range of alternative 
suppliers for its space and missile technology. The most viable 
prospects are the MTCR signatories, especially France. Outside 
the MTCR, the Iraqis have reportedly suggested the most 
imaginative arrangements for financing Brazil's missile program. 



161 "Problems, Achievements in Programs with Argentina, PRC," 
(in Portuguese), Tecnoloqia & Defesa no. 31, 1986. 

162 "Swiss Companies Outflank the Industrial Countries' Export 
Embargo," (original in German), Berner Zeitunq , 3 January 1989. 

163 See "O Japao vai a Lua," Veja, 31 January 1990, 53. 

1 AA 

For a broad review of Brazilian-Japanese economic 
relations, see Leon Hollerman, Japan's Economic Strategy in Brazil: 
Challenge for the United States (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 
1988) . 



91 
Negotiations with the Chinese and Soviets have led to numerous 
agreements, but with limited significance. 



92 



FINAL CONCLUSION 

The strict observance of MTCR guidelines by the United 
States has succeeded in curbing the development of Brazil's space 
and ballistic missile programs and revealed Brazil's 
vulnerability in those critical areas. Critics of the present 
policy argue that the U.S. policy has: 

(1) further strained Brazilian security relations with 
the United States; 

(2) weakened U.S. influence over Brazil's rocket and 
missile programs; 

(3) strengthened Brazilian ties with European suppliers 
(especially France) of space and missile technology; 

(4) driven Brazil into closer technological cooperation 
with the PRC and the Soviet Union; and 

(5) intensified Brazilian negotiations with Iraq and 
Libya. 

Even in the absence of the MTCR, Brazilian security 
relations with the United States may have deteriorated, and 
Brazil may have continued its movement toward Europe, the PRC, 
the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. While this may be true, 
the strict implementation of the MTCR increased the scope, 
intensity, and pace of the movement away from the United States. 

In balancing the goal of ballistic missile non-proliferation 
with that of improved U.S. -Brazilian security relations, U.S. 



93 
policy-makers are faced with limited options and declining 
influence. Space technology is one of the few areas in which 
Brazil has remained dependent almost exclusively on the United 
States, but even this dependency is being challenged by Brazil as 
it diversifies its sources of technology. After the United 
States, France is undoubtedly the preferred alternative, but 
Brazil has also sought cooperation with the PRC, the Soviet 
Union, Iraq, and Libya, among others. Such a pattern of 
diversification is likely to increase Brazil's autonomy vis-a-vis 
the United States. 

The limits of U.S. influence are most apparent in its 
inability to control major allies within the MTCR. The record 
demonstrates that while the United States can cajole and pressure 
its allies, it can by no means assume that it can limit their 
transfers of space or missile technology. The United States has 
even less control over the Soviet Union and the PRC, and is 
virtually powerless in restraining Brazilian ties with those 
countries. 

Brazil's growing autonomy in the area of space rocketry and 
possible development of ballistic missiles reflects a changing 
international system, where the strategic, economic, ideological, 
and political assumptions of bipolarity have increasingly given 



94 



1 AS 

way to the realities of multipolarity. Even if it can be 



posited that the strategic assumptions of bipolarity have lagged 
behind those of an economic, ideological, and political nature 
(the "bi-multipolarity" argument), 166 it is clear that the 
consensus on ballistic missile non-proliferation is weak. This 
suggests that the international environment is, in fact, 
increasingly multipolar, and that U.S. influence within the 
system is in relative decline. The concomitant rise of Europe, 
Japan, the PRC, and other actors in the international system has 
opened new opportunities for Brazil. 

Brazil's movement away from the United States is not cost- 
free. In diversifying its ties with other suppliers of space and 
missile technology, Brazil is paying a high cost in the short- 
term. Brazil will remain dependent on external sources for its 
space and missile technology for years to come, but by 
diversifying those sources, Brazil will become less vulnerable to 



165 For a discussion of this change, see James R. Kurth, "The 
United States, Latin America, and the World: The Changing 
International Context of U.S. -Latin American Relations," in Kevin 
J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, editors, The United States and 
Latin America in the 1980s (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1986) : chapter 1. 

166 

For a review of theories on international system structure 
(multipolarity, bipolarity, etc.) and stability, see James E. 
Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of 
International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1981, second edition): 162-168. For a review of bi- 
multipolarity, see Richard N. Rosencrance, "Bipolarity, 
Multipolarity, and the Future," Journal of Conflict Resolution , 10 
(September 1966): 318. 



95 
U.S. actions. Brazilian policy-makers have decided that the 
long-term benefits of such diversification exceed their costs. 

The U.S. policy of denying space and missile technology to 
Brazil leaves one with a sense of deja vu. In the mid-1970s, the 
United States sought to limit the transfer of nuclear technology 
to Brazil and was subsequently replaced by West Germany as the 
major supplier of such technology. Eventually, Brazil embarked 
upon a "parallel" (indigenous) nuclear program that has produced 
significant results. Under the nuclear regime, arguably the most 
restrictive of its kind, Brazil has demonstrated that with 
political will, it may be able to achieve nuclear weapons 
capabilities - though at a higher cost and at considerable delay. 
Under the less restrictive ballistic missile regime, there is 
little doubt that Brazil eventually will achieve a medium-range 
ballistic missile capability if it so chooses. When it attains 
such a goal, it will be with greater autonomy vis-a-vis the 
United States than it has enjoyed at any time in the post-World 
War II period. 

In closing, the systemic changes discussed above, while 
conditioning the parameters within which the United States can 
act, are by no means deterministic. The inauguration of 
President Fernando Collor de Mello on 15 March 1990 could signal 
a new opportunity for the United States to improve security and 
trade relations with Brazil, especially if Collor de Mello 



96 
succeeds in implementing the internationalist development 
strategy he has charted. Cooperation could be attained only 
through careful negotiations, mutual respect, and sufficient 
incentives and guarantees for each country. The United States 
could signal its willingness to cooperate by transferring space 
technology within category II of the MTCR. Measures of 
reciprocity on the part of Brazil could include signing the NPT, 
accepting in full the Tlatelolco Treaty, endorsing agreements 
that prohibit the diversion of space technology to the ballistic 
missile program, etc. The opportunity for the United States to 
nurture the Brazilian space launch program is rapidly slipping 
away to foreign sources. If the United States waits much longer 
to pursue such cooperation, it is doubtful whether a sudden 
liberalization of MTCR restrictions on the part of the United 
States could alter significantly the present pattern. If the 
United States seizes the opportunity, it may be able to improve 
relations with Brazil without jeopardizing its commitment to 
ballistic missile non-proliferation. 



97 



APPENDIX 

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME 

i 
STATEMENT BY THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR PRESS RELATIONS 

APRIL 16, 1987 

The President is pleased to announce a new policy to limit 
the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons. The U.S. Government is adopting this policy today in 
common with the governments of Canada, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. These 
nations have long been deeply concerned over the dangers of 
nuclear proliferation. Acting on this concern, these seven 
governments have formulated Guidelines to control the transfer of 
equipment and technology that could contribute to nuclear-capable 
missiles. This initiative was completed only recently, following 
several years of diplomatic discussions among these governments. 
The fact that all seven governments have agreed to common 
guidelines and to a common annex of items to be controlled serves 
to prevent commercial advantage or disadvantage for any of the 
countries. Both the Guidelines and its Annex will be made 
available to the public. 

The President wishes to stress that it is the continuing aim 
of the United States Government to encourage international 
cooperation in the peaceful use of modern technology, including 
in the field of space. The Guidelines are not intended to impede 
this objective. However, such encouragement must be given in 
policies of the U.S. Government. 

The United States, and its partners in this important 
initiative, would welcome the adherence of all states to these 
guidelines in the interest of international peace and security. 



98 



MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME: 
FACT SHEET TO ACCOMPANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT 

The United States Government has, after careful 
consideration and subject to its international treaty 
obligations, decided that, when considering the transfer of 
equipment and technology related to missiles whose performance in 
terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters, it will act 
in accordance with the attached Guidelines beginning on April 16, 
1987. 



GUIDELINES FOR SENSITIVE MISSILE-RELEVANT TRANSFERS 

1. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks 
of nuclear proliferation by controlling transfers that 
could make a contribution to nuclear weapons delivery 
systems other than manned aircraft. The Guidelines are 
not designed to impede national space programs or 
international cooperation, in such programs as long as 
such programs could not contribute to nuclear weapons 
delivery systems. These Guidelines, including the 
attached Annex, form the basis for controlling 
transfers to any destination beyond the Government's 
jurisdiction or control of equipment and technology 
relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of 
payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint 
will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers 
of items contained within the Annex and all such 
transfers will be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
The Government will implement the Guidelines in 
accordance with national legislation. 

2. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which 
term includes equipment and technology. Category I 
items, all of which are in Annex Items 1 and 2, are 
those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I 
item is included in a system, that system will also be 
considered as Category I, except when the incorporated 
item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. 
Particular restraint will be exercised in the 
consideration of Category I transfers, and there will 
be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until 
further notice, the transfer of Category I production 
facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of 
other Category I items will be authorized only on rare 
occasions and where the Government [A] obtains binding 
government-to-government undertakings embodying the 
assurances from the recipient government called for in 
paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and [B] assumes 
responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure 



99 

that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is 
understood that the decision to transfer remains the 
sole and sovereign judgment of the United States 
Government. 

3. In the evaluation of transfer applications of Annex 
items, ( the following factors will be taken into 
account: 

A. Nuclear proliferation concerns; 

B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and 
space programs of the recipient state; 

C. The significance of the transfer in terms of 
potential development of nuclear weapons delivery 
systems and other than manned aircraft; 

D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, 
including the relevant assurances of the recipient 
states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5. A and 5.B 
below; 

E. The applicability of relevant multilateral 
agreements . 

4. The transfer of design and production technology 
directly associated with any items in the Annex will be 
subject to as great a degree of scrutiny and control as 
will the eguipment itself, to the extent permitted by 
national legislation. 

5. Where the transfer could contribute to a nuclear 
weapons delivery system, the Government will authorize 
transfers of items in the Annex only on receipt of 
appropriate assurances from the government of the 
recipient state that: 

A. The items will be used only for the purpose stated 
and that such use will not be modified nor the 
items modified or replicated without the prior 
consent of the United States Government; 

B. Neither the items nor replicas nor derivatives 
thereof will be retransferred without the consent 
of the United States Government. 

6. In furtherance of the effective operation of the 
Guidelines, the United States Government will, as 
necessary and appropriate, exchange relevant 
information with other governments applying the same 
Guidelines. 

7. The adherence of all States to these Guidelines in the 
interest of international peace and security would be 
welcome. 



100 



SUMMARY OF THE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY ANNEX 

[Only the full text of the Annex is authoritative, and it 
should be consulted for precise details.] 



Category I 



Complete rocket systems [including ballistic missile 
systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets] 
and unmanned air vehicle systems [including cruise 
missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance 
drones] capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload 
to a range of at least 300 km as well as the specially 
designed production facilities for these systems. 

Complete subsystems usable in the systems in Item 1, as 
follows, as well as the specially designed production 
facilities and production. equipment therefor. 

Individual rocket stages; 

Reentry vehicles; 

Solid or liquid fuel rocket engines; 
Guidance sets; 
Thrust vector controls; 
— Warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing 
mechanisms. 



Category II 



Propulsion components. 

Propellants and constituents. 

Propellant production technology and equipment. 

Missile structural composites: production technology 

and equipment. 

Structural materials. 

Flight instruments, inertial navigation equipment, 

software, and production equipment. 

Flight control systems. 

Avionics equipment. 

Launch/ground support equipment and facilities. 

Missile computers. 

Analog-to-digital converters. 

Test facilities and equipment. 

Software and related analog or hybrid computers. 

Reduced observable technology, materials, and devices 

Nuclear effects protection. 



101 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 



CGWIC - China Great Wall Industrial Corporation 

CMFA - Comando Gexal das Forcas Armadas (Armed Forces Joint 
Command) 

COBAE - Comissao Brasileira de Atividades Espaciais (Brazilian 
Commission of Space Activities) 

CTA - Centro Tecnico Aerospacial (Aerospace Technical Center) 

Embraer - Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. 

EMFA - Estado Maior das Forcas Armadas (General Staff of the 
Armed Forces) 

Engesa - Enqenheiros Especializados S.A. 

Esca - Engenharia de Sistemas de Controle de Automacao S.A. 

FILA - Fighting Intruders at Low Altitudes 

FRG - Federal Republic of Germany 

IAE - Instituto de Atividades Espaciais (Space Activities 
Institute) 

IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency 

Imbel - Industria de Material Belico do Brasil 

INPE - Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (National 
Institute of Space Research) 

Inscom - International Satellite Communication 

MECB - Missao Espacial Completa Brasileira (Brazilian Complete 
Space Mission) 

MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime 

NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

Parcom - Participacoes e Consultoria 

PRC - People's Republic of China 



102 
LIST OF ACRONYMS (continued) 

SBTS - Sistema Brasileiro de Telecomunicacoes para Satelite 
VLS - Satellite Launching Vehicle 



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